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It has been argued by researchers that collective behavior ,  as a 
field of study in sociology, lacks important theoretical and methodo-
logical developments .  This has resulted in limited empirical knowledge 
of collective behavior. There exist many inadequacies in our present 
theoretical development.  These include a failure to not only specify 
a social dimension of collective behavior, but also, to separate cause 
and effect, and to describe collective behavior. Scholars have argued 
that in the study of collective behavior, we are lacking sound , thee-
retical perspectives and definitions of collective behavior, which have 
resulted in poor and unsyst ematic observations of phenomena. 
As a way of resolving these problems , it has been hypothesized that 
researchers must pay attention to the elementary features of collective 
behavior, which are essential for an understanding of collective behavior. 
These elementary features can provide empirical data on the crowd , per �' 
and include variables such as the physical conditions created by dense 
aggregates of people, crowd shape, crowd boundaries, and crowd movement.  
In sum, this thesis reviews what many argue are the essential ele-
ments of collective behavior which have been ignored or not clearly· re-
searched, and using two well-known events, attempts to assess whether 
thia is true or not. The two events chosen are the Berkeley Free Speech 
Movement and Kent State University (May, 1970) . In this thesis, the con-
cern focuses on where studies stand in regard to coverage of these events. 
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An evaluation of these episodes will indicate what we did and what we 
did wel l ;  what needs to be done in the future ; and finally what can and 
cannot be dealt with adequately. If we attended to gathering infor­
mation of the type suggested in this thesi s ,  would we be better able to 
empirically evaluate occurrences of collective behavior? 
An analysis of Kent State University on May 4 , 1970 and the Berkeley 
Free Speech Movement on October 1-2 , 1964 , in l ight of the elementary 
features of collective behavior, indicates that researchers have a valid 
argument that we have little theoretical or methodological knowledge 
pertaining to the crowd. When these events took place, researchers made 
an inquiry into collective behavior on a level at which general infor­
mation concerning the crowd and its participants was given. What needs 
to be done in the future is to bring research to a level at which analysis 
includes the examination of the crowd as an empirically distinct phe­
nomenon. Two major implications of  this research are that :  ( 1 )  A more 
comprehensive description of the crowd would be produced , and (2) Such 
information should help us to account for the occurrences of violence 
in such episodes . In conclusion , to establish the social properties of 
collective behavio r ,  future research must consider the elementary features 
of collective behavior. 
ii 
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INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Collective behavior is a broad field of study in sociology , encom­
passing many types of events .  In fact , Berk (1974:1) notes that "There 
is a wide disagreement among sociologists about the nature of collective 
behavior and a considerable debate about whether a distinct type of 
human activity exists which should be singled out for this special name . "  
Collective behavior also overlaps with many areas of sociology, such as 
deviance and political sociology. An episode of collective behavior 
can vary in purpose , duration , degree of violence involved , and the 
social acceptability that the public assigns to the event . The spectrum 
of what is called "collective behavior" is wide and ranges from a single , 
short-lived outburst , to a long-range, organized movement.  
DETERMINING THE THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 
According to Milgram and Toch (1965: 568) , "The phenomenon of col­
lective behavior admits of several theoretical foci, and there is no 
single set of questions that constitute the proper set of questions 
about the crowd" (emphasis supplied) .  While numerous theoretical foci 
do not constitute a problem, the lack of theoretical clarity does cause 
problems. McPhail (1972:1) argues that during " . • .  the past quarter 
century , there have been repeated pleas for theoretical development and 
systematic research in collective behavior, (YetJ . there have been 
1 
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no appreciable changes in our theoretical approaches to individual and 
collective behavior sequences since LeBon's publication of The Crowd 
(1895) and Floyd Allport ' s  response ( 1924) (cf . Pickens , 1975) . " 
The lack of  theoretical development has resulted in limited empir­
ical knowledge of collective behavior .  Since theories present guide­
lines for research, undeveloped theoretical guides result in little 
useful knowledge for advancing a field of study. According to McPhail 
( 1972:2) , such theoretical development requires an analytical scheme 
which would " . • • specify what is to be accounted for before ad­
vancing, debating , and testing the merits of competing causal variables . "  
He further states that " the causal variables advanced by existing 
analytical schemes are essentially static variables presumably located 
inside the individual and allegedly predisposing him to behave" (McPhail, 
1972: 11) . The "why" of what happened in a collective behavior episode 
cannot be adequately explained until the researcher examines the "what";  
e . g . , what actually took place in terms of  numbers , persons , locations , 
and movement .  These must be fully and accurately explored , which i s  not 
done often. 
Weller and Quarentelli (1973:665) note that "Social theories are 
at their weakest in the analysis of some of the most interesting and 
challenging aspects of contemporary societies , including the social 
movements and episodic outbursts so salient in recent America" (emphasis 
supplied) .  The public and many "exper ts , "  including social scientists, 
persist in viewing and analyzing crowds with inappropriate terminolqgy 
(e.g . ,  irrational , emotion-laden, violent) .  Collective behavior phe­
nomena have been analyzed in terms of ad hoc theories. which may be a 
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result of a continued lack of theoretical ties between collective be-
havior and general sociological perspectives (Weller and Quarentelli, 
1973) . 
In summary , theoretical perspectives offer guidelines to gathering 
empirical data about collective behavior phenomena. As McPhail ( 1972: 
12) notes, 
The theoretical inadequacies of existing analytical schemes 
have created the methodological problems in obtaining system­
atic knowledge of individual and collective behavior sequences. 
Resolving the problems of what to look for, and where, are 
steps in the direction of achieving a useful analytic scheme. 
RELATED THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Failure to Specify a Social Dimension of Collective Behavior. An-
other barrier to the development of a fully sociological theory of col-
lective behavior, as indicated by Weller and Quarentelli (1973) , is the 
failure to identify the social properties of collective behavior. Weller 
and Quarentelli (1973:672) state that "Most sociological treatments of 
collective behavior have been sidetracked from preceding to define their 
initial problem as one requiring conceptual elaboration at a social 
level . "  When referring to an event as an incident of collective behavior, 
we are assuming there are two or more participants within a certain area 
engaged in a similar activity and that their behavior is o�viously col-
lective. 
Milgram and Toch (1965:507) define collective behavior, in par t ,  as 
" • • •  group behavior . • •  which depends on interstimulation among par-
ticipants . "  By s tudying only the characteristics of the individual par-
ticipants in the event ,  we may be losing a deeper and more comprehensive 
understanding of what happened. An empirical s tudy at the individual 
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level should not result in neglecting the social aspects inherent in 
collective behavior. 
Failure to Separate Cause and Effect .  Fundamental to the relation­
ship between explananda and explanantia " • • •  are explicit definitional 
criteria for both classes of phenomena • . • investigators must delimit 
beforehand what will or will not constitute a change in each" (Pickens , 
1975:60) . McPhail (1972:12) finds that "Existing schemes have confused 
the behavioral phenomena to be accounted for with the causal variables 
advanced to explain those phenomena . "  Further specification is required 
of what , when, or how, whose behaviors are collective (McPhail, 1972) . 
This brings up the point of methodological issues in collective be­
havior as particularly related to the theoretical and definitional prob­
lems . A comprehensive and well-thought-out theory requires variables 
that are clearly defined. A lack of clarity in the definitions of con­
cepts and variables fails to direct the investigator s '  search . There­
fore, in studying collective behavior ,  we must advance further specific 
categories of observable behavior .  
Failure to Describe Collective Behavior . Fisher (1972) notes that 
collective behavior is often treated by sociologists as a residual cate­
gory which, w ith a few notable exceptions, provides framew orks in which 
to study collective behavior ,  but these proponents fail to carry through. 
in any sys.tematic way a detailed description and analysis of those groups 
which lie at the heart of collective behavior--that is , crowd s .  Milgram 
and Toch (1965) argue that a good way of classifying crowds cannot be 
decided on in the absence of a good theory of crowds , and no taxonomy 
seems fully adequate to the task of naming all crowd phenomena . An 
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examination of the development of s chemes which classify types of crowds 
reveals a general failure to consider explananda independent of expla­
nantia (Pickens, 1975) .  A question that can be raised i s :  Do crowds 
exhibit certain features or similarities independent of their purpose 
or setting. Many social scientists (cf. McPhail, 1972; Milgram and Toch , 
1965; Weller and Quarentelli, 1973) advocate studying crowds, per�' 
rather than the characteristics of the participants. As Milgram and 
Toch (1965: 518) emphasize, "Typically the crowd has not been what has 
been s tudied but where things have been s tudied. "  McPhail (1972: 3) notes 
that one of the failures of existing analytic schemes is that minimal 
attention is paid " . . . to what people do with and in relationship to 
one another. 
Pickens (1975:25) refers to theorists, such as Blumer, who have ar-
gued that (1) the crowd in collective behavior " 
usual circumstances are in evidence" and (2) " 
• occurs when un­
individuals in crowds 
negotiate their circums tances in ways not typical in operation . "  In res­
ponse, Pickens (1975) argues that those statements may be quite true but 
do not define the crowd. "The crowd must be defined or characterized in 
its own right independent of alledged causes [but] collective be-
havior lacks an established terminology with which to differentiate, de­
fine, and identify its objects of investigation" (Pickens , 1975:25) .  It 
is not enough to explain the purpose of the crowd (why it has gathered) ,  
but one should also pay attention to the actions of the group . McPhail 
(1972:4) reiterates this concern when he argues that "existing schemes 
have provided no criteria in terms of which an observer can know and re­
cord the existence, continuation, or termination of the ' crowd ' . " It is 
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further stated that " . • . substantive content directs attention to the 
unique and idiosyncratic features of  event s ,  [but this] information . • .  
hardly provides the basis for establishing the recurrent and universal 
behavior pattern for which a general theory of individual and collective 
behavior must account" (McPhail , .. 1972:4). 
Fisher (1972) points out that a characteristic of incidents of collec-
tive behavior is that reports are confused and fragmented, and attempts 
to explain collective behavior with the aid of academically imposed cate-
gories have resulted in the view of crowds as that of undifferentiated 
entities under the sway of pervasive forces. The description of crowds, 
from which theory proceeds,  is based on reports of  human observers, and 
while a fully articulated theory linking the variables of macroscopic 
analyses has not been proposed , characteristics of the crowd at this 
level may suggest important regularities (Milgram and Toch, 1965 ) .  An 
individual in conjunction with a group level of analysis may provide in-
sight into previously misunderstood collective behavior phenomena . Ac-
cording to McPhail (1972:2) : 
Incisive observation presupposes a set of instructions 
specifying the phenomena to be observed . Fruitful 
hypotheses presuppose statements of relationships which 
are amenable to empirical scrutiny and which can be 
demonstrated to produce, alter, and terminate the 
phenomena under examination. Existing analytic schemes 
have failed to meet these criteria . 
Berk ( 1972 : 1 13) argues that 
The problem with the controversy surrounding crowd 
behavior is that coupled with the intense motivation 
is the lack of good data on many crucial aspects of the 
phenomena--a situation which too frequently finds re­
searchers taking long , speculative leaps from their data. 
An episode of collective behavior may be of such a short duration that 
the researcher will not be prepared to study it or will rely on secondary 
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or after-the-fact interviews. This can lead to the failure of adequately 
dealing with the social-level theory and data. This failure may not be 
limited to the short-duration episode but can be equally applied to the 
organized social movements which can have a longer time span. For example, 
metaphors have been used as an introduction into the analysis of ideas 
that are not explicitly examined (Berk, 1972). 
Summary. To reiterate, the referents for the term "collective be­
havior," per se, have never been clearly specified (McPhail ,  1972) .  Al­
though discussions of crowd taxonomies " • • • make reference to the 
issue of behavior as a distinguishing cri terion for crowds , none provide 
[sic] a detailed specification for such" (Pickens, 1975:57) . Thus, in the 
study of collective behavior, we are lacking sound, theoretical perspec­
tives and definitions of collective behavior , which has resulted in poor 
and unsystematic observations of phenomena. 
THESIS PROBLEM 
What is necessary for accurate descrip tions of phenomena to be ex­
plained and what is necessary for that explanation besides description? 
Milgram and Toch ( 1965:515) argue that "A detailed theory is needed that 
can spell out what kinds of crowd transformation are possible and what 
kinds are not possible; which changes in crowd form and mood are revers­
ible and which cannot go back to the starting state." To accomplish this 
requires attention to numerous variables previously ignored in traditional 
theorizing about collective behavior. 
In addition, it has typically been the individual coming to the crowd 
and the aggregate results that have been the unit (s) of analysis. It is 
presently argued that this results in a gap which hinders an investigation 
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and understanding of the phenomena of colrective behavior .  McPhail 
(1972 :4). notes, "Our concern should [focus on] • • •  the formal and re­
current behavior sequences which are observable wherever human beings 
are co-present • II This· involves not only the mundane activities 
of human behavior ,  but also the more media attention-getting events such 
as riots and student protest s. Along these lines, Fisher (1972:189) ar­
gues that " • • • an understanding of the complexities of crowds rests 
upon an examination of those aspects which are out of awareness or 'not 
worth the telling ' . "  What some have thought to be "not worth the telling, "  
I will argue is exactly what are essential building blocks for pursuing 
an understanding of collective behavior. 
The task of this thesis is to review two major episodes of collec­
tive behavior in light of this understanding. It is acknowledged that 
these episodes have been defined as incidents of collective behavior 
largely by the body of works which have been criticized. This thesis is 
concerned not so much with whether one can actually define these episodes 
as collective behavior ,  but more so with an evaluation of the studies 
which pertain to these events. Specifically, I propose to examine what 
the studies actually looked at, what do students of collective behavior 
know as a result of these works, and finally, what is left unknown. An 
investigation of the literature will allow one to judge whether the stated 
criticisms actually reflect our lack of information concerning the ele­
mentary features of collective behavior. In so doing, it will be noted 
whether or not these elementary features of collective behavior have been 
attended to. If the literature indicates that these· features have been 
attended to, the concern of this research will shift to the degree of 
accuracy regarding these dimensions which includes how consistent in the 
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literature are the subjective and empirical interpretations. If these 
elementa'ry features have been ignored, the question of whether or not 
such information could have been gathered arises, and if so , whether it 
would allow researchers to answer the important questions raised about 
such phenomena or not. 
In sum, this thesis problem is to review what many have argued are 
the essential elements of collective behavior which have been ignored or 
not clearly researched and to assess, using two well-known events , whether 
this was true or not concerning these events. If such elementary features 
have been ignored , could they have been studied, and if so , what would 
have been the outcome in terms of the episodes themselves and in terms of 
future empirical research? 
OUTLINE OF THESIS 
In this chapter, many of the problems involved in the study of col­
lective behavior have been dealt with. It has been suggested that theo­
retical attention to the elementary features of collective behavior would 
provide what is necessary to understand and explain such phenomena. 
Chapter Two will deal with those features which can be examined to obtain 
useful information regarding collective behavior. It will also spell out 
some specific variables that should be considered when theorizing about 
the empirical study of crowds. Chapters Three and Four involve the util­
ization of these features and variables to assess the state of the liter­
ature regarding two major events of collective behavior :  Kent State, 1970, 
and the Berkeley Free Speech Movement , 1964. A summary of the intentions 
of this thesis, what was done, the results,  and finally, an assessment 
and suggestions for future research regarding collective behavior will be 
presented in Chapter Five. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ELEMENTARY FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 
INTRODUCTION 
To understand the phenomena of collective behavior, a researcher 
must review the elementary features of the crowd. This concerns the 
theoretical notion of dividing up long-term crowd phenomena into be­
ginnings, middles ,  and endings. 1 Thus , collective behavior must be 
viewed as process not just outcome . The emphasis of this thesis is on 
what actually goes on during the middle stage. The elementary features 
of collective behavior, which will be discussed, pertain mainly to the 
middle stage. It is argued that this stage is least empirically re-
searched or understood by students of collective behavior .  Many of the 
measurement techniques ( e . g . , survey research and gathering information 
on demographic characteristics). currently used to study episodes of 
collective behavior are aimed at obtaining information concerning con-
ditions preceding and resulting from crowd behavior (Berk, 1972). ·Berk 
( 1972: 1 14) notes that this " • • •  results in analyses of crowds that can 
best examine input and output but little in between . "  Therefore, what is 
lacking is essential empirical data on crowd behavior, per�· In this 
chapter, I will try to emphasize those "in between" areas to which we 
1 Concerning the criteria ·for judgement of  beginnings , middles, and 
endings , McPhail (1972) also cites deficiencies in both beginnings and 
endings ,  respectively , the formation and dispersal of the crowd . In this 
thesis, the middle stage, i . e . ,  crowd activity, per se , encompasses formation 
and dispersal . 
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should pay more attention. The distortion of facts can be common through­
out a research process. Berk (1972) has noted that in many instances , 
the participants may be too involved to give accurate descriptions of 
their behavior ,  there is memory failure, or the participants may be hos­
tile to the researcher. A researcher should be better able to under­
stand and explain collective behavior by attending to the following areas 
of concern regarding what goes on during episodes of these phenomena. 
CROWD CHARACTERISTICS 
Leadership. Milgram and Toch (1965) find that one theoretical is­
sue implicit in crowd activity is that of the role of leadership . One 
can begin with the question of what role and function does or can the 
leader play. Also, how does a person or persons come to be recognized 
by the crowd as the leader? Does the leadership change or vary according 
to the tactics of the crowd, and consequently , how is their support gener­
ated? McCarthy and Zald (1973) stress the increasing professionalization 
of leadership in social movements. This professionalization allows for 
the greater allocation of resources to the movement, thereby allowing it 
to gain more influence. It is stressed here that an overt leader which 
can be readily identified by the media may only be a figurehead. Using 
observation and participant input, a researcher may be able to identify 
a more influential leader (cf. Moreno, 1934) . 
In the case of a short-lived outburst of collective behavior, how, 
if at all , is a leader or group of leaders acknowledged? In addition, 
how is the leader (s) acknowledged and/or what constitutes recognition of 
leadership by participants? This can be an important question, due 
to incidents of violence involved in some episodes of collective be-
12 
havior.  The degree of influence generated by the leader (s) toward the 
participants and activities of the crowd is a crucial issue. By identifying 
both the formal and , if possible ,  informal leader (s) in an episode of col­
lective behavior ,  one may better understand the tactics of the crowds as a 
whole. 
Physical Conditions Created � Dense Aggregates of People . Milgram 
and Toch (1965 : 5 16) note, "The human body, by virtue of its size, shape, 
and physical extension in space comes to play a determining role in crowds 
. • .  a comprehensive theory of crowds must take into account, in a sys­
tematic rather than a metaphoric fashion, the role played by the physical 
conditions created by dense aggregates of people . "  No matter how many 
people are reported by various sources , there is a limit to the amount of 
people per unit of space. A question that can be raised is:  How does the 
density of persons in an event affect the reaction to and among the crowd? 
The texture of the core of  a crowd depends, in par t ,  upon its density and 
the arrangement of the �odies of the participants (Fisher, 1972) . Density 
may also affect the perceptions of the participants and the agents of social 
control . The stimuli generated by a high density situation can result in 
a seemingly more threatening environment to those involved. Very little 
physical space per person inhibits movement and may present itself to those 
involved as a partial loss of control regarding their own actions. A high 
density situation entails that any movement by a person will be tied to 
others around them. It is no longer action by a single person independent 
of others , but also includes the reactions it generates by being physically 
close to other s .  The major point , as it applies here, is that without 
attending to density, researchers may be overlooking a possibly important 
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causal factor in accounting for the outgrowth of violence. Relatedly, 
this factor may then help us in our prediction of incidents of collec­
tive behavior. 
Crowd Shape. Macroscopic properties of the crowd have considerable 
theoretical and practical importance (Milgram and Toch, 1965) . Milgram 
and Toch (1965 : 5 18) state that "Pending the availability of systematic 
data, the observer in crowds is limited to a few rough generalizations 
about basic crowd structures and their functions . "  It  is suggested here 
that more specific detail is required in terms of feedback between par­
ticipants , and between participants and the agents of social control. This 
feedback may be vocal and/or nonvocal (e.g. , gestures , gaze orientations) 
and is something students of collective behavior need to pay attention to. 
Although this type of coverbal communication has been extensively used in 
other areas of sociology , it has not been utilized very effectively in 
collective behavior. One consequence of paying attention to feedback in­
volves the dissemination of information, for example , whether the spread 
of information is facilitated or hindered by a circular crowd which is 
focused on a single speaker , or a more rectangular crowd as is characteristic 
of marches, or crowds separated by a street (e.g. , watching a march or a 
parade ) .  It may b e  interesting to note which of these types have been more 
prone to outbreaks of violence and why this is so. Factors (i . e .  crowd 
shape and its impact on communication) , in addition to the content of the 
events, may give rise to a more hostile environment. 
It has been suggested that the best way to view the overall structure 
of a crowd is from directly overhead (Milgram and Toch, 1965) . Milgram 
and Toch (1965 : 5 18) further argue that "If individuals are randomly dis-
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tributed over a flat surface in the starting situation, a point of com­
mon interest in the same plane creates a crowd tending toward circularity 
• [which] permits the most efficient arrangement of individuals around 
a conunon point of focus . "  But, it is not inherent that crowds focusing 
on a single speaker or event will be consistently circular. Other vari-
ables must be taken into consideration before one assumes that the above 
statement is correct. Numerous variables such as the physical setting of 
the situation, the speaker ' s  platform, the number of people in the crowd, 
and the PA system will all serve to temper the supposed circularity of 
a crowd focused on a single speaker or event . The situational facilities 
have important consequences for the shape or form the crowd takes . This 
then has important implications for the characteristics and maintenance 
of the boundary of the crowd. 
Crowd Boundaries. Fisher (1972 : 192) argues that in episodes of col-
lective behavior , " • crowds exhibit graduated but distinct edges . "  
This also affects the degree of involvement of the participants . Those at 
the edge of the crowd, it  has been proposed, are more or less onlookers . 
It has been hypothesized that those who are most intensely motivated to 
carry out the crowd's purpose will be disproportionally represented at the 
crowd ' s  structural core (Milgram and Toch , 1965; Meyer and Seidler, 1978) . 
While this may , in part, be true, it  is also plausible to suggest that not 
only motivation but timing of the event can serve to determine the location of 
persons . It is a reasonable idea that those more motivated will be at the 
core, but also, many highly motivated persons may be scattered throughout 
the crowd because they arrived at a later time. In sum, the timing of an 
assembly may function to determine the location of people, whether at the 
1 5  
core, inner fringe , o r  outer fringe, in addition to , or i n  spite of , moti­
vation . Milgram and Toch ( 1965: 520) indicate, "The dimensions of inner 
space are related to a number of variables , such as the degree of attrac­
tion or repulsion to the speaker, his elevation , the size of the ring, and 
the pressure from those in the rear . "  
The boundary of crowds is related to its shape . According to Mil-
gram and Toch (1965) , a boundary defines the limit or extent of the crowd 
and is characterized by permeability and sharpness .  Fisher ( 1972) finds 
that two factors are involved in permeability: ( 1 )  the physical proximity 
of  the persons composing the boundary and (2) the expectation of the person 
who may want to cross it (Fisher, 1972:19 3) . The more dense a crowd is,  
the more likely it will be that an outsider would hesitate to infiltrate 
the crowd ; whereas at the fringe of the crowd , the density tends to be 
much lower which facilitates increasingly possible movement by a spectator 
or another participant (Fishe r ,  1972) . The measurement of  the sharpness of 
a boundary is not always easy to deduce empirically (Milgram and Toch, 1965) . 
It has been suggested that the degree of  interpenetration of two boundaries 
can be specified by applying a grid over the photographs taken at different 
phases of a riot and determining how many squares are mixed and how many 
contain unmixed elements (Milgram and Toch, 1965) . While the boundary of 
a crowd may not always be distinctive , the empirical study of  polarization 
constitutes the best single measure of crowd boundary (Milgram and Toch, 
1965). But Milgra.m and Toch (1965) also emphasize that it is anybody ' s  
guess what polarization value defines the exact boundary of  the crowd. It 
is important to understand the boundaries in collective behavior because 
th.e clash of two hostile group s ,  as is common in episodes of collective 
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behavior,  is largely a boundary confrontation (Mil gram and To ch, 1965) • 
The importance of this should be noted in regard to unders tanding violence 
between agents of social control and participants. The violation of a 
boundary in a hostile environment can be seen as a severe threat to the 
crowd. Therefore, the invasion of either group into the other ' s  "area" 
constitutes a boundary confrontation and consequently it is conducive to 
an outbreak of violence. Boundaries exert a more complex limit on the 
observer who must interpret the permeability of a boundary, and his access 
is tempered by his interpretation (Fisher,  1972) . This can be of con­
siderable importance to agents of social control in events of collective 
behavior. 
Individuals or Groups in Collective Behavior.  There has been debate 
on whether individuals or groups make up a crowd . Milgram and Toch (1965 : 
523) note, "Most crowds cannot be thought of as an aggregate of  isolated 
points , since a fair proportion of the participants are likely to have 
specifiable kinship or friendship ties to one or more participants in the 
assemblage . "  Again, one finds an emphasis on social-level data. Perry 
and Pugh ( 1978:23) support this when they argue that "As a form of group 
action, collective behavior is not reducible to psychological propositions 
about individuals acting in isolation from other people. " It seems apparent 
that people will attend a gathering with other people they knew previously , 
and " . . • role relationships constitute substructures and govern the 
participants to a greater degree than is ordinarily supposed" (Milgram and 
Toch , 1965 : 523) . This is supported by Aveni ( 1977) in a study of an assem­
blage of persons . The data indicate that a majority of persons came with 
at least one other person and also, sixty-four percent stated that " 
they saw or met others they recognized or knew" (Aveni, 1977 : 98) . The im-
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plications of this, as recognized by Aveni (1977 } , is. that the crowd must 
be studied on two levels , an individual level and als-o a structural or 
group level . Those at the core of  the crowd can have a relationship with 
other motivated participants by virtue of their concern .J! priori to the 
event , or as a result of the event , in that a shared concern results in 
the creation of an episodic relationship. 
Crowd Size. This brings up the topic of estimating crowd size . Jacohs, 
in 196 7 ,  estimated the highest density that a crowd could achieve and pointed 
out that by applying his formula, official estimates of crowd attendance can 
often be exaggerated. Pickens (1975) finds that an indication of the lack 
of concern with explananda is centered on the issue of an aggregate size; 
that there exists no consensus on what nwnber is required for a crowd to be 
a crowd . When we have two people engaged in a similar activity within a 
specified area, we can say ·their behavior is collective but we would hardly 
call it a crowd . Besides the number of  persons,  what distinctions �is t ,  
if any , between a small gathering and a large group or assemblage? What are 
the criteria for a small gathering versus a large group, besides the opinion 
of the observer. Milgram and Toch (1965:  534). indicate, "The theoretical 
significance of numbers for the phenomena of collective behavior is subject 
to dispute" hut they also argue " . • • surely certain crowd phenomena de­
pend for their expression on large numbers . "  More importantly is the ques­
tion: "At what size do all the essential features of a large crowd appear?" 
(Milgram and Tech , 1965 : 534) . 
Berk ( 1972) has found that crowd behavior is often characterized as im­
plicitly irrational and/or a mysterious phenomenon where the individual is 
caught up and lost . There is an assumption that people in crowds tend to 
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be motivated by the same interests or that they are nearly identical in 
other ways (Berk, 1972) . This idea had its start with LeBon in 1895, and 
in all these years , not much has changed in the characterization of crowds.  
The assumptions pertaining to crowds , so far, have had no empirical base. 
Milgram and Toch ( 1965: 535) note that "One of the factors presumed to 
emerge in crowds of sufficiently large size is anonymity. " Yet Berk (1972) 
argue s ,  "What happens to people in crowds is an empirical question on which 
we have little information, and into this factual vacuum are drawn a va­
riety of speculations • • • •  " This , I believe, reinforces my posit ion 
that we know little about what goes on in the crowd itself . 
The movements and actions of the crowd may have a great deal of regu­
larity, which suggests something other than irrationality and anonymity. 
The findings of social scientists (cf. Aveni , 1977;  Milgram and Toch, 
1965 ; Perry and Pugh, 1978) , as suggested earlier in this chapter , in­
dicate that the participants in events of collective behavior do exhibit 
degrees of familiarity and role relationships with each other. Therefore, 
can we just assume that this stops when the crowd is formed, and again, 
when is a crowd a crowd? Milgram and Tech (1965 : 568) question the idea of 
collective response from a crowd when they state, . "When wholly contra­
dictory assertations are supported by the crowd, we must ask whether the 
same individuals in the crowd are responding . "  Different subgroups with­
in the crowd may respond to different statements, and this represents just 
a normal spread of opinion in a group (Milgram and Tocb, 1965 } .  Researchers 
must not assume that the crowd as a whol e  is responding in the same manner 
without identifying subgroups , if any, and their reactions . These are areas 
which must be given attention in collective behavior in a systematic and 
empirical fashion. 
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Participant Characteristics. Another area that calls for attention 
is the characteristics of participants .  Milgram and Toch (1965: 537) find 
that "The composition of crowds is functionally related to the actions of 
crowds , and the precise makeup of a crowd may play a very important role 
in determining the form of collective behavior that arises . "  Obviously, 
a riot by the Hell ' s  Angels will take a different form than a demons tration 
by mothers against nuclear arms , although both are forms of collective be-
havior. But in many instances , such as college-student demonstrations , 
the differences may be negligible. Fisher (1972 : 200) argues that " . • .  
the simple issue of who participated is problematic • • • this imprecision 
of description can be traced to objective features that account for the 
confusion and irremediable subjectivity of the reports . "  It should be 
mentioned that " • • .  beliefs, attitudes , values , personality orien-
tations and other such predispositions or tendencies to behave are not 
directly observable . • • [but] they may be inferred from behavior other 
than those they are supposed to explain" (McPhail ,  1972 : 1 1 ) .  McPhail 
( 1972:  1 1 )  further states, "Measures of attitudes and personality • • •  as 
well as socioeconomic and demographic attributes have yielded consistently 
low correlations with behavior . "  In terms of episodes of collective be-
havior, " . . .  there is no substitute for the direct observation and 
measurement of authentic crowd behavior" (Milgram and Toch, 19.65:584}., 
although this may be supplemented with indirect observation, such as s.ur-
veys and questionnaires, with good result s .  
Crowd Movement .  Crowd behavior involves the motion and collective 
locomotion of participants. McPhail ( 1 9 7 2 : 3 )  notes that " • • •  almost no 
attention has been given to the formation and dispersal of [crowds or col­
lections of peopl� nor to their distribution across time and space . "  This 
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information is important for the control of crowds and better prepa:ration 
for the studying of crowds.  This will aid researchers in knowing where 
and what to look for. Researchers must give a considerable amount of at­
tention to formal and recurrent sequences of individual behavior (McPhail, 
1972) . In terms of assemblages, which cannot be taken for granted , we 
must account for the movement of persons from their disparate locations in 
one space and time to a common location in another space and t ime (McPhail, 
1972) . This patterned sequence provides useful information on the event it­
self by pinpointing specific actions rather than generalizing about the 
actions of the crowd as a whole. Which individual or groups of individuals 
moved where? Where did the more active participants move to? What about 
the fringe members or onlookers? Events· of collective behavior, according 
to Fisher ( 1972 : 188) 11 • • • are painted in terms of grossly defined, des­
cript ive categories which neither distinguish subtle variations nor give 
hints of the manifold ways in which crowds are assembled . 11 McPhail (1972:  
6) notes that 11 • • •  irrespective of the distance, mode, speed or frequency 
of movement ,  assemblages are formed when the direction of the persons ' 
physical movements converge on a cormnon time-space location . "  The same 
can be said of dispersal, but the action " is an alterat ion in the 
direction of body movement of co-present persons away from a common time-
space location" (McPhail ,  1972 : 10 ) .  Therefore, McPhail (1972) argues 
that attention be given to the actual phenomenon of collect ive behavior, 
itself ,  irrespective of the qualities of participants ;  in McPhail ' s  ( 1972:  
6) words,  "Given an assemblage of  persons,  what behavior must occur; when , 
and by whom to constitute collective behavior?" This will involve fo­
cusing on other behavioral alignments. 
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SUMMARY 
The preceding paragraphs contain the elements researchers need to 
pay attention to in the study of collective behavior. Many authors 
(cf . Berk, 1972 ; Fisher, 1972; McPhail, 1972; McPhail and Wohlstein, 1982; 
Milgram and Toch, 1965; Pickens , 1975;  Wohlstein, 1977) have advanced 
strategies to deal with the observation of these elements .  These include 
projective devices ; team reporting; the reduction of the observer-to­
observed ratio; survey research; identifying and describing recurrent be­
havior patterns by means of direct observation in "natural settings" and 
then manipulating these under experimental conditions ; systematic des­
cription; and participant behavior reports. 
Milgram and Toch ( 1965 : 584) state, "The most important need is to 
get the main questions off the debating rostrum and move them to a level 
at which measurement,  controlled observation, and imaginative experiments 
can begin to play some part in choosing among competing views . "  
In light of the theoretical and methodological issues I have covered , 
I propose to examine the Berkeley Free Speech Movement and Kent State (May , 
1970) to establish what we can learn from past efforts . These two events 
drew unprecedented attention by social scientists. Many books and articles 
have been published , resulting from these research efforts . Also, these rwo 
events , as student protest s ,  generally reflect a part of the substance of 
collective behavior. The events which took place at Kent State University 
are a series of episodes of collective behavior which happened in a four 
day period. Social movements , such as the Berkeley Free Speech Move-
ment, are forms of collective behavior which best fit the criterion of 
aiming at change in the world and least �ualify as amorphous or unorganized. 
Therefore, this event should be covered most systematically . 
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These two events are chosen as a starting point in which to evaluate 
previous efforts to analyze events of collective behavior .  In this thesis, 
the concern focuses on where studies stand in regard to coverage of events. 
In previous sections, I have criticized what past research efforts have 
focused their attention on; the next chapters will be a critique of the 
coverage. Are the previously made criticisms actually warranted? An 
evaluation of these events will indicate what we did and what we did well ; 
what needs to be done in the future; and finally, what can and cannot be 
dealt with adequately. Is the debate on collective behavior accurately 
reflecting the present state of affairs? How far is the ideal from the 
real? In sum, if we attended to gathering information of the type sug­
gested in this review, would we be better able to empirically evaluate 
the occurrences of collective behavior? Along with this evaluation is 
the issue of prediction. A thorough knowledge and understanding of the 
aforementioned features may enable researchers to explain what occurred 
and why it occurred . Within time , it may also aid us in coming to con­
clusions concerning whether, if a number of these features are present 
in a given situation, a certain outcome will result. This information 
is of particular importance when incidents of collective behavior result 
in violence. An analysis along the lines suggested by scholars in this 
area may provide the necessary information to answer crucial questions 
regarding collective behavior. 
CHAPTER III 
AN ASSESSMENT OF TiiE ELEMENTARY FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR: 
THE KENT STATE EPISODE 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 4 ,  1970 , Kent State University received extensive attention 
as a media event . Joseph Kelner , chief counsel for the 13  victims , had 
to go through 60 cartons of information in order to prepare his court case 
for what he states as "The most documented homicides in American History" 
(Kelner and Munves , 1980 : 18) . On this date, a major episode of collective 
behavior occurred at Kent State University. The general approach used to 
examine this event will focus on answering the question: What information, 
if any, has been obtained by researchers from this episode that pertains 
to the elementary features of collective behavior presented in Chapter 
II, and concurrently, how did they go about it? In this chapter, I will 
provide a brief summary of the events of the first few days in May, 1970,  
with particular attention to the date of May 4 .  I will also review the 
major literature that examined this event at Kent State University (e . g . , 
what was looked a t ;  how the information was obtained ; when were inter­
views granted) .  Finally, and most importantly, special consideration will 
be given to those elements of collective behavior that researchers (e . g . ,  
McPhail , 1972 ; Milgram and Toch , 1965 ; Pickens , 1975) argue should be our 
main concern. 
The approach that I will take in this chapter , in regard to the event 
of May 4 at Kent State University and in the next chapter on the Berkeley 
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Free Speech Movement ,  will examine three areas : (1) the origins or back­
ground of the major incidents ;  (2) behaviors within the event itself; and 
(3) the outcome(s) of the even t .  By this evaluation, I hope to determine 
the strengths and weaknesses of  these accounts and whether or not ad­
ditional information of the type suggested could have been gathered . If  
so,  would it enhance our understanding of  these events .  A superficial 
and/or weak account of the events would suggest that we must turn our at­
tention to the elementary features of collective beha�ior that have been 
offered within this paper. Also, any d iscrepencies which exist regarding 
what occurred at these events would indicate that a shift of  focus of 
concern is needed in our evaluations of events of  collective behavior .  
Finally, i f  these features have been at tended to in the literature, the 
question arises of how well. 
For the purpose of this paper , a brief consideration of the events 
of May 1-3 (the background and participants) will comprise the origins of 
May 4 ,  which is my most irmnediate concern. An analysis of activities with­
in the event itself will only concentrate on the riot of May 4 ,  as will an 
examination of the outcome. Obviously, the outcome of May 4 is not iso­
lated from the events of May 1-3. 
BACKGROUND TO MAY 4 ,  1970 
Kent State University is located near the city of Kent, Ohio , which 
has a population of approximately 30,000. In 1970, the campus itself had 
a population of approximately 2 1 ,000. As of 1970, Kent State University 
was one of the 25 largest universities in the U . S . ,  situated on more than 
600 acres of land (Bes t ,  1981} . Demons trations or rallies by the students 
before this time were relatively unknown . An incident on April 8, 1969, 
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between campus police and students which subsequently led to the arrest 
and suspension of four student s ,  set a pattern for the university ' s  handling 
of demonstrations (Best , 198 1 ) . Another incident that should be men-
tioned before proceeding to the events of the first few days in May, 1970 , 
is described by Best (1981 : 32) as follows : I I  • on April 30, President 
Nixon ordered U . S .  and South Vietnamese troops to invade Cambodia, further 
widening the scope of the conflict �etween the students and Nixon adminis­
tratiori) . " 
On Friday, May 1 ,  a few incidents happened that set the tone for the 
next three days. According to Best (198 1 : 33) , "In response to the in-
vasion of · Cambodia, a group of History graduate students--World Historians 
Opposed to Racism and Exploitation (WHORE) --quickly organized a protest 
demonstration for noon at the Victory Bell on the Commons . "  According to 
reports ( i . e. , Best, 198 1 ;  Scranton Commission Report , 1970) , approximately 
500 students attended this rally. At the conclusion of this rally, an-
other one was called for Monday, noon, with the intention of  discussing 
II . attitudes of  the university administration toward the Camhodia in-
cursion and toward other student demands , including the abolition of the 
ROTC Program" (Scranton Commission Report,  1970 : 240) . 
A 45-minute rally was held at 3 p . m .  by the Black United Students 
(Scranton Commission Report , 1970) . The discussion centered around re-
cent campus disturbances and drew approximately 400 persons (Scranton 
Commission Report,  1970) . On the basis of these two peaceful rallies, 
President White of Kent State University left for Iowa for the weekend . 
As stated in the Scranton Commission Report (1970 :240} , "He did not re-
turn to Kent until noon Sunday, after the city and campus had experienced 
two nights of turmoil . "  
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That night , a disturbance by the students around the bars on North 
Water Street caused what was originally estimated to be $10, 000 of property 
damage and seriously disrupted traffic. As the Scranton Commission Re­
port (1970 : 241) indicated,  "The crowd grew increasingly boisterous • . .  
[also_] some of the crowd, which had grown to about 500, started a bonfire 
in the street . "  At about 1 2 : 30 a .m. , Mayor Satrom, 'of Kent Ohio, de­
clared a state of  emergency, which Best (1981: 36) describes as a strategic 
mistake . Mayor Satrom also ordered all the bars closed and established an 
1 1  p.m. curfew for the city and a 1 a.m.  curfew for the campus (Best, 1981 ) . 
Between 1 and 2 a.m. , 15 Kent City police and 15 Portage County deputies 
moved the student crowd back to the campus by using tear gas (Scranton 
Commission Report, 1970) . Rumors that the Kent State 4 were behind this 
night ' s  events were never substantiated. The Kent State 4 were students 
who had been arrested in 1969, following a skirmish with the campus police.  
The situation leading to this arrest arose when six persons , including 
these four student s ,  attempted to post a list of demands (e. g . , abolition 
of the ROTC Program on campus and removal of a state criminal investigation 
laboratory from campus) at the administration building (Bes t ,  1981) . The 
four students involved not only were arrested but were also suspended from 
school. The Kent State 4 were affiliated with the Kent State SDS (Students 
for a Democratic Society) chapter. 
The rumors about Friday night ' s  events were abundant on Saturday, 
May 2 ,  and had a great deal of impact on the action taken that day. In 
the morning, according to the Scranton Commission Report ( 1970: 244 1 ,  Mayor 
Satrom " • banned the sale of liquor and beer, firearms and gasoline 
unless pumped directly into the tank of a car . "  A curfew was set for 
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the period between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.  in the city of Kent , Ohio, and be­
tween 1 and 6 a.m.  on the campus . It  should also be noted that there were 
no injunctions on any rallies (Scranton Commission Report,  1970) . Because 
of the rumors , a rumor control center and emergency operations center were 
established which " • • •  would be the administration ' s  command post for 
the remainder of the weekend" (Bes t ,  1981 :4 1 ) .  This was the first day 
that the National Guard was officially called into Kent, Ohio , but it was 
after the students had burned the ROTC building . It  should be pointed out 
that the concept of the National Guard ' s  presence during this time would 
be for them to assume control over the city and university (Best, 1981 ) .  
The Scranton Commission Report (1970 : 248) indicates that at 7 : 30 p .m . ,  a 
crowd assembled on the Commons near the Victory Bell ; then the crowd moved 
to the dormitories, picking up new members; and "By the time they headed 
back toward the Commons ,  the crowd had grown to around 1 ,000 . "  Best (1981) 
reports that, initially , around 7 : 30 p .m . , there were about 600 students 
and when they were back on the Commons , the number was between 1 ,000 and 
2 ,000. The ROTC building was on fire at approximately 8 : 45 p.m. Best 
(1981 :46) noted that from 10 to 12 p .m. , " • . •  the Guard cleared the 
campus, using tear gas II 
On Sunday, May 3 ,  President White returned and Governor Rhodes entered 
the scene . Governor Rhodes alluded to the idea that the previous days ' 
events on Kent State University were led by radical students and non­
students who were " • • • worse than the orownshirts and the Communist 
element, and also the nightriders and the vigilantes" (Scranton Commission 
Report, 1970 : 254) . On this day, there seemed to be a misunderstanding of 
a statement made by Governor Rhodes ref erring to an injunction " • • • 
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equivalent to a state of emergency • • •  " (Scranton Commission Report , 
1970 : 255} . It  seems that the university officials understood this injunc-
tion to mean tnat the National Guard had complete, legal authority on the 
campus (Best , 198 1} . At this time, according to the Scranton Commission 
Report (1970 : 255} , university officials : 
Prepared and distributed 1 2 , 000 leaflets which listed 
curfew hour s ;  said the governor ,  through the National 
Guard , had assumed legal control of  the campus ; stated 
that all outdoor demonstrations and rallies, peaceful 
or otherwise, were prohibited by the state of  emergency ; 
and said the Guard was empowered to make arrests . 
Though Best (1981 : 5 1 )  argues that 
The leaflet was based on the assumption that the state 
of emergency was in effect (which was not true} and, as 
a result ,  "the only accurate information in this docu­
ment are the curfew hours . "  
Sunday afternoon, the campus was relatively quiet , but "Sunday night 
witnessed an escalation in violence between demonstrators and authorities , 
indicating that both groups were losing patience with the other" (Best, 
1981 : 53) . That night, a group of students began to gather around on the 
Commons at 8 p .m.  Best (1981) and the Scranton Commission Report (1970) 
indicate that by 8:45  p .m. , the crowd had grown so large that the curfew 
was altered from 1 a.m.  to 9 p .m. , at which time the Ohio Riot Act was 
read to the crowd and the National Guard gave them five minutes to disperse.  
The crowd did not readily disperse but broke into two groups . One group 
headed for President White ' s  home , was tear-gassed by the National Guard, 
and then headed back to the Commons .  Some o f  the students from this group 
joined the second group, which went to Prentice Gate at the corner of  Main 
and Lincoln, blocking the traffic in the intersection of  Main and Lin-
coln . As the Scranton Commission Report (1970 : 257} noted: 
l 
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A sizable crowd sat down in the intersection of Lincoln 
and Main, next to the gates , and asked to speak with 
Satrom and White about six demands : abolition of the 
ROTC; removal of the Guard from campus by Monday night;  
lifting of the curfew; full amnesty for all persons 
arrested Saturday nigh t ;  lower s tudent tuition; and 
granting of any demand by the Black United Students. 
This request was denied and, at 11 p.m. , the police told the demonstrators 
that the curfew was in effect and the Ohio Riot Act was read once again 
(Bes t ,  1981) . As Best (198 1 :  53) further reports, "Rocks were thrown , 
obscenities shouted, while tear gas and a bayonet charge by the National 
Guard was used to clear people from the intersection and drive them back 
across campus . "  The Scranton Conunission Report (1970) noted that two 
students and three guardsmen were hurt in this confrontation. 
These three days had considerable importance for what was yet to 
come on May 4 .  The hostility between the s tudents and guardsmen had 
increased. This was due to a number of things . The students' hostility 
was a result of what they considered to be broken promises;  the guards-
mens' hostility was a result of the s tudents ' curses , s tone-throwing, and 
refusals to obey (Bes t ,  1981) . 
One final item pertaining to the National Guard is important. Im-
mediately preceding their orders into Kent, Ohio, the National Guards-
men were on duty in Akron, Ohio, " • • •  as a result of a truckers s trike 
which had been violent periodically" (Best, 198 1 : 32 ) .  Best ( 198 1 : 33) 
further notes that "These were the guardsmen ordered to Kent on May 2 ,  
after four days of hard , grueling, and potentially dangerous duty in 
Akron . "  
In light of the preceding information, I will present a description 
of the confrontation of May 4 between the s tudents and the guardsmen. Basi-
... 
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cally, I will give an account of those two hours and then review what 
and how the information was obtained regarding those elements of collec­
tive behavior brought up in Chapter II as essential to increasing our 
understanding and explanation of collective behavior. The concern of 
the following sections is an attempt to clarify the state _O.� .aff.a:i.:rs :r.e7 
garding these elements .  Have the elementary features been attended to . 
and if so , how well? The previous discussion of research regarding these 
features in Chapters I and II continually espouses that we have paid 
minimal attention to certain essential information that would provide 
us with a more complete understanding of crowds . The point of examining 
the literature pertaining to May 4 ,  with these elementary features kept 
in mind , is to evaluate where research regarding collective behavior 
stands. One can ask if the only deficiency involves inaccuracy of re­
porting and the lack of ·inter.subj ectivity, or have we also neglected what 
have been termed the essential building blocks for pursuing an under­
standing of collective behavior. 
THE EVENTS OF MAY 4 ,  1970 
To reiterate, on Friday, May 1 ,  a rally was called for Monday, noon , 
May 4 ,  to discuss the Cambodia incursion and other student demands . Most 
reports ( i . e . , Best ,  1981; Davies , 1973;  Kelner and Munves ,  1980; Scran­
ton Commission Report, 1970) agree that the purpose of the rally of May 
4 had changed : it was now a protest against the presence of the National 
Guard on campus. As Best (1981 :57}  notes ,  " • participation in the 
noon rally was viewed by some as a symbolic protest of and challenge to 
the authority of the Guard .on campus . "  Not all students who had gathered 
on the Commons at 1 1  a . m. were there to demonst·rate. Many of · the students 
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on the Commons, 'Which. serves as a crossroads on th.e campus, were going to 
and from classes or were there out of idle curiosity. The Scranton Com-
mission Report ( 1 9 70 : 265} indicates: 
A majority of the crowd was watching the tableau from 
the patio of Taylor Hall and from the slopes around the 
adjacent buildings of Prentice, Johnson, and Stopher 
Halls.  The hills made a natural amphitheater from which 
students could watch events on the Commons floor. 
But in the end , it made no difference why the students were assembled. 
The actions of the National Guard did not distinguish between the demon-
strators and the spectators . 
According to Best ( 1 981 : 57 } ,  "People began to gather on the Commons 
as early as 11 a . m . "  By 1 1 : 4 5 ,  the crowd had grown quite large, although 
no one estimate of the crowd size was dominant (as we shall see later 
in this chapter} .  At this time, a Kent State University policeman , 
Harold E .  Rice, ordered the students to disperse ,  thereby enforcing a 
decision made that morning that no rally would be allowed (Scranton Com-
mission Report , 1970) . Davies ( 1 9 7 3 : 33) contends that "The students were 
lawfully assembled and the National Guard was unlawfully ordering them to 
disperse . "  The students reacted to this order by shouting obscenities 
and throwing stones . Best ( 1981 :58) indicates, " . • •  there were no 
university officials involved in the attempt to stop the rally 
[President] White apparently assumed that the Guard was now in control of 
the campus and there was no need for him to be personally involved."  At 
1 1 :55  a . m . , the guardsmen chosen to carry out the dispersal orders were 
ordered to "lock and load" their weapons (Davies, 1973) . At this time, 
students began to ring the Victory Bell and 8-10 guardsmen fired two 
volleys of tear gas canisters at the crowd (Scranton Commission Report, 
l 
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1970) . But this did not accomplish the task of dispersing the crowd . As 
Best (198 1 : 59) indicates, " • • .  a stiff crosswind and poor aim by the 
guardsmen made the barrage largely ineffective . "  This had the effect of 
increasing the students ' hostility; they proceeded to throw the canisters 
back at the guardsmen. 
Because of this confrontation between the students and the guards-
men , Brigadier General Canterbury ordered the National Guard troops to 
move out (Scranton CoIIUDission Report , 19701 . The purpose of this was to 
disperse the crowd and then bring the troops hack to the ROTC building. 
It should be pointed out that the weather was very warm on this day and 
the guardsmen were wearing gas masks. These gas masks made seeing and 
breathing difficult (Best, 1981) . The�efore , the already harried guards-
men were made more uncomfortable . 
During the guardsmen ' s  advance ,  some of the students retreated, 
" . . • some of them going back up and over the hill behind the Victory 
Bell (Blanket Hill) and around Taylor Hall" (Best, 1981 :60} . Davies 
( 1973 : 36) reports : 
• . . a few students lingered at the crest of Rlanket 
Hill to shout obscentities at the men of Troop G ,  who , 
since the departure of Company C ,  now held the extreme 
left flank of the line with Company A strung out to the 
righ t .  
When Brigidier General Canterbury reached the crest o f  Blanket Hill, 
he concluded that it would be necessary to push the students beyond a 
football practice field which lay about 80 yards below the crest of Blan-
ket Hill (Scranton CoIIUDission Report , 1�70) . Mos t Kent State University 
reports conclude that this was an error in judgement. This movement al-
lowed the students to break into two groups , thereby harassing the guards-
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men from the Prentice Hall parking lot and the walk at the bottom of 
Blanket Hill (Bes t ,  1981) . As Best ( 1981 : 6 1 )  further states : 
• • • the Guard were under a heavy barrage of rocks and 
verbal abuse, and the tear gas vollies [sic] merely pro­
duced a "tennis match , "  with the demonstrators hurling 
the tear gas cannisters back at the guardsmen. 
The guardsmen stayed on the football field for approximately 10 
minutes , then Brigadier General Canterbury " . • .  ordered his troops to 
retrace their steps back up Blanket Hill" (Scranton Connnission Report ,  
1970 : 268) . The Scranton Commission Report (1970 : 268) further notes: 
The Guar d ' s  march from Blanket Hill to the football field 
and back did not disperse the crowd and seems to have 
done little else than increase tension, subject guardsmen 
to needless abuse,  and encourage the most violent and 
irresponsible elements in the crowd to harass the Guard 
further.  
The students, seeing the guardsmen retreating , continued to taunt them. 
Best (1981 :62) indicate s :  
The crowd did not act en masse; some stayed a t  the foot 
of Blanket Hill . . •  · and others ran around the end of  
Taylor Hall toward the Commons. Individuals and small 
groups followed the guardsmen as they trudged up the 
hill, their backs to the people below. 
These individuals and small groups were the most active and hostile par-
ticipants . The Scranton Commission Report (1970 : 271)  contends that this 
core group consisted of between 20 and 50 people and pursued the guards-
men " • • .  at a range varying from 10 to 80 yards . "  
According to Davies (197 3 : 37) , there were three times when the 
guardsmen aimed their rifles at the students: ( 1 )  At 1 2 : 05 ,  when three 
guardsmen aimed their rifles at an undisclosed target; (2) at approxi-
mately 1 2 : 1 5 ,  when members of Troop G aimed their rifles at students in 
the Prentice Hall parking lot ; and (3) at 1 2 : 24 ,  when the guardsmen 
actually fired. 
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There is still a great amount of controversy over the issue of why 
the guardsmen fired and who actually fired. Tile Scranton Commission Re-
port (1970: 273) indicates that in the end: 
Twenty-eight guardsmen have acknowldeged firing from 
Blanket Hill . Of these , 25 fired 55 shots from rifles, 
two fired five shots from a . 45 caliber pistols, and one 
fired a single blast from a shotgun. Sound tracks 
indicate that the firing of these 61  shots lasted 
approximately 13 second s .  
The outcome of this confrontation was four persons killed and nine 
wounded. Another outcome was individuals ,  groups,  a university, a town, 
a state, and a nation in turmoil, wondering how and why it happened and 
getting few answers. The closest student wounded was 20 yards from the 
Guard : the farthest , 245-250 yards (Scranton Commission Report,  1970) . 
The closest student killed was 85-90 yards from the Guard; the farthest ,  
130 yards (Scranton Commission Report ,  1970) . 
There was only one other incident of students gathering that day. 
As the Scranton Commission Report ( 19 70 : 278) indicates , "After the casual­
ties were removed , [approximatel� 200-300 students began to gather on 
the hills overlooking the Commons . "  Faculty Marshalls appealed to the 
students to leave. Some did, others had to be carried off.  Approximately 
one hour after the shooting, the area was clear of students and guards-
men. Of the reports that I have reviewed , there was considerable agree-
ment that the use of loaded f irearms by the guardsmen was inappropriate. 
The Scranton Commission Report (1970:289) , I feel, sums it up best: 
The actions of some students were violent and criminal , 
and those of some others were dangerous , reckless , and 
irresponsible. The indiscriminate f iring of rifles into 
a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were 
unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable. 
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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DESCRIPTION 
The episode of collective behavior of May 4 has been described 
above in generalities for two reasons : (1)  to confine the specific dis­
cussion of the elements of collective behavior brought up in Chap ter I I  
and discussed in the following sections ; and (2) because the reports that 
I have reviewed (i. e. , Davis , 1973; Eszterhas and Rob erts, 1970; Scran-
ton Conunission Report , 1970) have, in fact, described the crowd and its 
movements in terms of generalities rather than specifics. For example, 
the Scranton Commission Report (1970: 263) indicates , "The students res­
ponded with curses and stones ; "  and Eszterhas and Roberts (1970 : 151)  note, 
"The crowd was growing and milling . "  These generalities are the type of 
statements that many social scientists ( i . e . , Fisher, 1972 ; Milgram and 
Toch, 1965 ; McPhai l ,  1972; e t  al . )  argue w e  should avoid because they do 
not answer the following types of questions : Which students threw stones-­
all of them or only an active core, of how many , and how was the crowd 
growing, obviously in numbers, but how many ? 
The examination of the confrontation between the guardsmen and the 
students was greatly aided by photographs . The Scranton Commission Re­
port ( 1 9 70) used over 50 photographs in its analysis. But even with 
these photographs , I found that the elements of collective behavior, such 
as the number and locomotion of the participants , were inaccurately re­
ported or coated in generalities. I will now turn attention to those 
elements of collective behavior brought up in Chapter I I .  
Leadership. We know that a group of History graduate students-­
World Historians Opposed to Racism and Exploitation (WHORE)-- called a 
rally for Monday noon, but we do not know if they were a part of the ac-
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tive core on that day. This raises the question of whether there was a 
leader(s) in the student group. Lewis (1978:]5) notes, "Whether there 
were leaders present on May 4 is a source of considerable dispute . "  A key 
point regarding this is how do we know leadership when it is present? One 
certain aspect is that the Kent State 4 �  four students previously arrested 
and suspended from school following an incident with the campus police 
in 1969, were not behind the event, and the Scranton Commission Report 
(1970) indicates that specific radical leaders did not influence the 
events . Davies (1973:221)  cites one of the principal conclusions drawn 
by the FBI investigation : "Apparently, the crowd was without a definite 
leader, although at least three persons carried flags . "  Out of the books 
and articles that I have reviewed , only one other article dealt with leader­
ship within the student group . Analyzing the event using ' Smelser ' s  (1962) 
theory of collective behavior ,  Lewis (1978:75.1  indicates , "My own obser­
vation indicated no formal leadership from either groups or individuals . "  
But by using Smelser ' s  ( 1962) idea that "events" can serve as models of 
leadership , Lewis ( 1978 : 75) further offer s ,  " . • .  the chanting of the 
active core • served to channel the verbal action of the entire body 
of the students toward the National Guard . "  
In terms of the National Guard, Davies ( 1 9 73 : 34) indicates that "The 
advance of the National Guard was directed by three senior officers : 
Brigadier General Canterbury, Lieutenant Colonel Fassinger, and Major 
Jones . "  But as the Scranton Commission Report (1970: 273} notes , "Canter­
bury, Fassinger, and Jones--the three ranking officers on the hill--all 
said no order to fire was given . "  So much for the National Guard ' s  leader­
ship. 
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Physical Conditions Created !r Dense Aggregates of People. The 
degree of density of the crowd is an important determinant of the subj ec­
tive interpretation of the immediate environment. It also plays an im­
portant role in gauging how much freedom of physical movement is possible 
by the participants and can vary from those at the core to those members 
at the fringe. This feature was neglected in the literature that was 
reviewed,  in that no information on this element of collective behavior 
was found. 
Crowd Shape . For the most par t ,  I found no research indicating the 
crowd shape . In utilizing Smelser ' s  ( 1 962) theory of collective behavior ,  
particularly the organization o f  a hostile outburst,  which partly depends 
on a preexisting crowd structure, Lewis ( 1978 : 75} found that "The pres­
ence of students moving back and forth across the Commons • . . created a 
fairly organized precrowd structure in a clearly defined ecological space . "  
This still does not inform us on the shape of the crowd but does lend us 
an idea. 
In discussing the National Guard ' s  movement onto the football field, 
Davies (1973:  38) noted, "Thus he [Canterbury] exposed the guardsmen to 
virtual encirclement by students " Thus , the focal point was the 
National Guard and the crowd of students formed a circular pattern around 
them. A circular arrangement permits,  according to Milgram and Toch (1965:  
518) , " • the most efficient arrangement of individuals around a point 
of focus . "  As stated previously, this statement cannot simply be assumed 
to hold true in all cases and should be the basis for further research. 
This type of statement , for instance, does not indicate for whom this ar­
rangement is most efficient, whether the speaker or event, the crowd , or 
38 
both. In the above incident, however, the crowd did form a circular ar-
rangement ,  which may indicate that circularity is tempered by a directional 
versus a nondirectional event. 
Lewis (1978: 73) also indicates another time when the guardsmen were 
the focal point , but does not mention the shape of the crowd . Lewis 
(1978: 73) notes that " . • •  the focal point of the Guard around the ROTC 
building made it quite easy for the active core to direct its action to-
ward the Guar d . "  
Crowd Boundaries. Three groups of students were identified by Lewis 
(1978) : the active core on the Commons, the cheerleaders , and the spec-
tators . Lewis (1978 : 71) further notes : 
The core stood around the Victory Bell yelling at the 
Guard who were protecting the burned down ROTC building. 
The cheerleaders and the spectators were concentrated 
primarily on Taylor Hill and the nearby dorms which are 
both on the edge of the Commons. 
More specifically, the cheerleaders were near the active core on Taylor 
Hall hill, and the spectators grouped further up the hill on the sur-
rounding buildings (Lewis, 1978 ) .  
The Scranton Connnission Report (1970) noted that once the National 
Guard started to retrace their steps up Blanket Hill, approximately 100 
spectators on the east terrace of Taylor Hall watched the National Guard; 
another 100 on a slope below the east side of Taylor Hall threw rocks ; 
and about 10-50 persons , following the guardsmen at ranges of 20-80 
yards, were the most active in the throwing of rocks . 
Even though the crowd had fanned out in different directions at 
times , Lewis ( 1978: 76) concludes , "The guard kept themselves as the focal 
point and students kept dividing into the active core, the cheerleaders 
., 
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and the spectators . "  But Lewis (1978) does not indicate how he arrived 
at that assessment.  
A boundary defines the limit or extent of the crowd and .is :cha�&c�. 
terized by permeability and sharpness (Milgram and Toch , 1965) . Davies 
(1973) makes a good point when describing the permeability of the crowd 
of students . Major Jones noticed a command confusion on the football 
field, and Davies ( 1973) , citing the Justice Department ,  revealed that 
"The Major walked through the crowd to find out if General Canterbury 
wanted assistance . "  Davies ( 1973) also cites Michner (197 1 ) ,  who noted 
that Major Jones rejoined the main force by elbowing his way through the 
crowd of students . Therefore, Davies ( 1973 : 38) concludes :  
If the demonstrators were as dangerous as Canterbury 
claimed after the killings , could a solitary officer 
have elbowed his way through them without some kind 
of  incident? 
Therefore , at this time , the density of the crowd was not very high, but 
the permeability was. 
Related to the permeability is the sharpness of a boundary. The 
sharpness of a boundary can provide a d escription of the distinction 
between two groups,  for example ,  participants and agents of social con-
trol. The sharpness may also indicate where a boundary confrontation is 
likely to take place. In the review of the literature , I found no re-
search indicating the sharpness of the crowd. In sum, there was no in-
formation delineating definite breaks between participants ,  and the par-
ticipants and the agents of social control. 
Individuals or Groups in Collective Behavior .  For the most part, 
the studies did not distinguish whether individuals or groups made up 
the crowd . Of the books and articles that I have researched, the Scran-
.• 
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ton Commission Report (1970 : 267) had only one statement dealing with 
students going as individuals or groups to the rally: "Among those who 
departed was a student who had gone to the rally with a classmate , William 
Schroeder . "  Kelner and Munves (1980) addressed the issue but limited it 
to the testimony involving those students wounded or killed. Eszterhas 
and Roberts (1970) reported on only a few students . 
Of these report s ,  it seemed pretty well split as to who went as 
individuals and who went with one or more persons.  There is some in-
dication that the students were familiar with one another .  As Eszterhas 
and Roberts (1970 : 146) note, "On campus the word was out. 'See you on 
the Commons at noon ' students called to each other as they trekked to 
class . "  
But this still leaves a considerable number o f  students that we do 
not know about. Most reports (i . e . ,  Bes t ,  198 1 ;  Davies , 1973;  Scranton 
Commission Report , 1970 ; et al . )  described the gathering of students in 
generalities. The Scranton Cormnission Report (1970:261)  was typical in 
describing the assemblage : 
About 1 1  a .m . ,  students began gathering on the Commons, 
apparently for a variety of reasons.  Some had heard 
vaguely that a rally would be held. Some came to protest 
the presence of the Guard. Some were simply curious , or 
had free time becuase their classes had been cancelled . 
Some students stopped by on their way to or from lunch or 
class. 
Both numbers and groups,  if any, were omitted from the analysis . 
Crowd Size. There is no major consensus in the literature estimating 
the crowd size on May 4 at Kent State University. In fact, the size of 
the crowd was often never mentioned. It  seems to be taken for granted 
that the students were acting as a single entity. 
: �, 
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At the start of the rally, Best (1981 :57)  indicates: 
People began to gather on the Commons as early as 1 1  a .m. 
Some were aware of the proposed noon rally and wanted to 
take par t .  Many went out of curiosity, oecause as many 
said , "They wanted to see what was going on. "  
What number constitutes "many" or "some" is left undefined. As the event 
progressed, the reports were more specific at various times , but a wide 
range still existed in terms of  number s .  Best (198 1 :  57)  notes that "By 
11 :45 a .m . , ninety-nine guardsmen faced .a crowd across the Connnons es-
timated at 1 , 200 to 4 , 500 . "  That is a considerahle gap. Davies (1973} 
reports a crowd size of 2 , 000 to 3 ,000. The Scranton Commission Report 
( 1970 : 263) notes two estimates : ( ! )" Fassinger estimated that by 1 1  :45 a . m . , 
the crowd had grown to more than 500 ; "  and (2) 11shortly before noon, there 
was a crowd of 2 , 000 or so on or near the Connnons . "  Eszterhas and Roberts 
(1970) concluded that the total . number o f  students was 4 ,500. Best (1981:  
57) , citing a survey by Taylor (197 1) , found that 70 percent of the students 
that Taylor ( 1971)  interviewed thought there were less than 2 ,000 people on 
the Commons at the time . 
In terms of the active core, Best (198 1 :  5 7 )  states, "There is agree-
ment an active core of people around the Victory Bell, numbering 200 to 
1 , 500, shouted slogans at the Guard . "  One can see that this varies by 
1 , 300 students--in my opinion, quite a few people .  Eszterhas and Roberts 
( 1970) estimate an active core of 1 , 500� while the FBI Report (Scranton 
Connnission Report , 1970) estimates 200. 
On the hills surrounding the Commons , Brigadier General Canterbury 
estimated 1 ,000 or more persons , with approximately 800 students on the 
Commons (Scranton Commission Report,  1970) . Best (1981 : 5 7 )  notes that 
' •• 
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" . • •  on the surrounding hill were 1 , 000 to 3 , 000 ' cheerleaders ' and 
' spectators ' . " Again _ a large discrepancy. Es.zterhas and Roberts (1970) 
indicate 3 , 000 on the hills. 
Participant Characteris tics. The characteri.stics of participants 
can usually be obtained fairly accurately after the event.  In my review 
of the literature on Kent State University on May 4 ,  this element of col-
lective behavior was researched , but in general , I found the focus to be 
on the political persuasion of the participants.  
The Scranton Commission Report (1970) noted that the FBI Report 
( 1970) came to the conclusion that neither the Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS) nor the Kent State 4 were involved in planning or directing 
the events of May 1-4. Therefore, the rally was mainly a student protest. 
The Scranton Commission Report (1970 :261 ) notes, "Many of the students who 
described themselves as ' straight '  or conservative, later attributed their 
presence at the rally to a desire to protest against the National Guard . "  
Eszterhas and Roberts ( 1970 : 1 5 1 )  cited a few students ' opinions on who 
was there : 
When he looked over the crowd, Michael Erwin felt the same 
way: "The crowd was made up of the Greeks , athletes , and 
the largest segment of the group were , like me, antiwar 
moderates . "  Student Buzz Terhune described the crowd this 
way : "You had superstraight Joe Fraternity and ultra­
radical Joe Freak out there . "  
In terms of political persuasion , Taylor, et al . ,  (1971)  distinguished 
between those students who attended the rally and those who did not. This 
was the only study that explored this difference. Taylor et al . ,  (197 1 : 68) 
note that "While only two percent of the observers and one percent of the 
nonattenders considered themselves radical , 28 percent of the participants 
indicated that they were radical . "  This suggests that self-selection was 
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an important factor in determining who participated on May 4, because 
self-identified "radicals" made up four percent of all students,  while they 
cons tituted 28 percent of  the rally participants (Taylor, et al. , 1971 ) .  
A study by Ademek and Lewis (1973 : 346) supports this when they state, 
"Our own data on the thirty participants indicate they were more 
radical prior to the event . "  Ademek and Lewis ( 1973) also matched the 
30 participants who definitely engaged in violent confrontation with 
authorities on May 4 with 30 other students who had not. These students 
were matched on six variables (viz. , sex, college maj or , parents ' po-
litical views , Hollingshea d ' s  (1957) two-factor social class index, 
religion, and college grade-point-average) , and " • • •  chi-square tests 
indicated no significant differences between the two groups on the matched 
variables with the exception of grade-point-average" (Ademek and Lewis,  
1973:  344) . In terms of grade-po
.
int-average, twenty percent of the par-
ticipants had GPAs of 3 . 0  or above while forty-three percent of the matched 
controls had GPAs of 3 . 0  or above . This finding was significant at less 
than the . 0 1  level. 
Further analysis indicated that the participants were more like.ly _to 
have engaged in previous protest activities (p ( . 0 1 ) . Also, they tended 
to see themselves more as either radicals , radical-liberals , or liberals 
than did the controls (p < . Ol) . Finally , Ademek and Lewis (197 3 : 344) indicate : 
In addition • • • the 30 May 4 participants proved not to 
differ significantly from their controls on the following: 
race, age, size of hometown, home state, academic class, 
father ' s  and mothe r ' s  educational levels , father ' s  and 
mother ' s  disciplinary style, and father ' s  occupation. 
As a result of their research, Ademek and Lewis (1973 : 347) find support 
for a radicalization hypothesis where social control violence appears to 
radicalize those who are confronted by i t ,  specifically , they argue that 
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" . . . the extreme social control force applied by the National Guard 
radicalized the students most directly involved . "  The research cited above 
tends to support McPhail (1972) who found that socio-economic and demo-
graphic attributes have a low correlation with behavior. 
Crowd Movement . With the use of direct and indirect observation , 
the movement of the crowd was recorded .  According to the Scranton Com-
mision Report ( 1970 : 270) , "The crowd ' s  movements can be reconstructed from 
testimony , photographs ,  and investigations . "  This was in reference to 
the crowd ' s  movement a few minutes before the shootings. All other spe-
cific reports of the crowd ' s  movement also dealt with the time before the 
shooting. 
Kelner and Munves ( 1 980 : 15)  note : 
In tragic accidents there are . the critical factors 
of time, space, and distance. Where a person was at a 
particular instant,  the exact sequence of events (did A 
happen before B or B before A? ) ,  and the directions in 
which participants or witnesses were moving are the es­
sential material out of which cases are built. 
Investigation of the process of events ,  as suggested above , is what 
researchers (cf.  McPhail ,  1972,  McPhail and Wohlstein, 1982 ; Wohlstein, 
1977) indicate we should give more systematic attention to, and suggestions 
have been offered to deal with this area. Kelner and Munves (1980:173) 
attempted to establish the above critic..al factors by using a film shot 
" • . . with an 8mm home movie camera f rom a distance of almost half a 
mile through a zoom lens that distorted distances . "  Kelner and Munves 
(1980} note that to compensate for these problems, the Justice Depart-
ment, using a photo-interpreting firm: 
enhanced the image by digital processing , along 
careful frame-by-frame measurements and calculations , 
revealed the precise movement of students relative to 
guardsmen just before the shooting. 
with 
which 
the 
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Kelner and Munves (1980 : 174) further note, "Here for the first time 
was complete information on the numbers of  students on the hill , their 
distance from the Guard, and the direction in which they had been moving . "  
The students '  speed was estimated at 3 to 10 miles per hour but was not 
accurately determinable (Kelner and Munves , 1980) . The minutes before the 
shooting was the only time I found an attempt to systematically record the 
crowd ' s  movement .  
In terms o f  the formation o f  the crowd , reports distinguished why 
the students came to the rally; noted that the Commons was a crossroads 
for the students between classes; and indicated, once assembled, where 
the students were . But these reports failed to give attention to the 
question of  whether the students came individually or with others, and 
were not consistent in estimating crowd size . 
Between the time of the formation of the crowd and a few minutes 
before the shooting, the movements of  the crowd were reported, especially 
in terms of the active core, but were not systematically researched . The 
crowd ' s  movement was reported in generalities ; e . g .  "The guardsmen marched 
across the flat Commons, the students scattering before them up a steep 
hill beyond the Victory Bell" (Scranton Commission Report, 1970 : 26 6 } .  
SUMMARY 
In sum, it seems that researchers are neglecting the elementary 
features of collective behavior . It was proposed that an examination of 
Kent State University in May, 1970 , in light of  the elementary features 
cited, would yield information on the stage of knowledge concerning episodic 
events of collective behavior. By drawing attention to these features , it 
was found that research on Kent State University did not deal adequately 
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with them. In fact, a description of the events was very general and in­
consistent across the literature. It follows accordingly that two points 
can be made as to why this is so:  (1)  the short span of time within which 
this event occurred did not allow researchers to adequately deal with this 
event; and (2) researchers were not adequately prepared to study this 
event in terms of theoretical knowledge o f  collective behavior and empirical 
knowledge of processes which involve the elementary features of collective 
behavior .  These two points need not be seen as distinct but can b e  viewed 
as complimentary. It is suggested that the latter point is the more prob­
lematic, due to researchers (e . g . , Berk, 1972;  Fisher, 1972;  McPhail and 
Wohlstein, 1982; Pickens , 1975) having advanced strategies to deal with 
the first point. 
By an examination of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement which spanned 
approximately three months , further evidence will be gathered as to how 
well the elementary features of collective behavior are attended to. The 
length of time involved in this event is considerably longer ; therefore,  
this event should be covered more systematically since social movements ,  
as a form of collective behavior, are noted to b e  more organized. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ELEMENTARY FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR: 
THE BERKELEY FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to the brief episodes of collective behavior involved 
at Kent State on the days of May 1-4 , the Berkeley Free Speech Movement 
spanned months in 1964. This duration may indicate either more organization 
on the part of students to achieve their stated goals and/or these goals 
were more readily attainable than those found at the Kent State protest .  
In light of this, this chapter will isolate and examine one incident within 
this time period and thereby at.tempt to arrive at further conclusions re­
garding our present knowledge of the methodological and theoretical issues 
involved in collective behavior .  
I t  would seem logical to suggest that our knowledge of the events at 
Berkeley during the last months of 1964 would be more comprehensive than 
that obtained at Kent State University. The basis for this argument is 
that since this movement lasted considerable longer, social scientists 
would have had more time to prepare and to focus their research efforts, 
thereby obtaining more accurate information concerning their area of in­
terest .  This will be the major focus of this chapter, a s  was true with 
Chapter III. The specific questions that will be addressed are as follows : 
( 1 )  What were social scientists concerned with when reviewing a particular 
episode of collective behavior in terms of the Berkeley Free Speech Move­
ment; and (2)  how well did they accomplish their stated objectives. 
4 7  
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Similar to Chapter III, a brief summary of the background of the 
events at Berkeley in the last months of 1964 will be provided , and secondly, 
there will be a review of the major literature that examined the particular 
chosen event,  and finally, attention will be focused on those elements of 
collective behavior that researchers (e . g . , McPhail , 1972;  Milgram and Toch, 
1965 ; Fisher , 1972;  Pickens , 1975) argue should be the main concern when 
researching episodes of collective behavio r .  
To reiterate the approach taken in Chapter I I I  and that will sub­
sequently be followed in this chapter, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement 
(henceforth ref erred to as the Berkeley FSM) will be examined within the 
context of three areas : ( 1 )  the origins or background of the major in­
cidents; (2)  within the event itself; and (3)  the outcomes of the event 
in light of their goal and what previously happened. By evaluating this 
event, further information can be generated on the degree to which the 
elementary features of collective behavior are attended to by social scien­
tists. Consequently, if these features have not been attended to , could 
this information have been obtained? If they have been, is the infor­
mation such as the type that has been shown in previous chapters to be 
warranted ; in other words , is  the information as detailed and descriptive 
as would be necessary for one to conclude that the elementary features of 
collective behavior have been attended? 
Finally ,  by comparing and contrasting this information with the in­
formation obtained in regards to Kent State University, final conclusions 
will be drawn as to where research efforts stand in regard to these aspects 
of collective behavior .  
For the purpose of this paper, a brief consideration of the events 
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which occurred from September through December, 1964 , i s  necessary to 
properly summarize the Berkeley FSM. The events which occurred in September 
will comprise the origins of the movement ,  although it can be argued that 
prior even ts ( e . g . , the civil rights movement in the preceding summer) were 
also involved. The capture of the police car on October 1-2 will be the 
main focus of analysis , and finally, those events preceding the police car 
incident will be summarized so as to acquaint the reader with the actions 
of collective behavior and the outcomes which followed. The rationale for 
choosing the police car incident involve s the considerable length of time 
(32 hours) during which the action took place, and also, it seems most con-
ducive to examining the elementary features of collective behavior (viz . ,  
boundary maintenance of the crowd, the action of common focusing , leader-
ship, crowd shape and crowd size) . 
The summary of the events which took place in the last months of 1964 
will be limited to reviewing the overt collective action by the students. 
The task of this thesis is to examine the literature on specifically chosen 
events of collective behavior in light of the previously proposed elemen-
tary features of collective behavior. It is not to debate the ideological 
or moral issues involved , nor to report on the various verbal and written 
interactions occurr ing within and between the adminis tration, faculty and 
students. It is the purpose of this thesis to e.xamine crowd phenomena, to 
study the crowd , per s e ,  and the methods of studying crowd phenomena ; in other 
words , the "what" not the "why . "  Therefore, these latter issues · will only 
be brought into the summary where it is deemed necessary • . It must be noted 
that this is not to argue that these aspects are not important or necessary, 
it is simply they are not relevant to the purpose at hand , i . e .  an analysis 
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of crowd phenomena. The ideological issues and behind-the-scenes behavior 
which took place have been covered by many books and articles (cf.  Bell and 
Kristol,  1969 ; Draper , 1965 ; Foster and Long, 1970 ; Glazer, 1970 ; Heirich, 
19 7 1 ;  Hook, 1970; Katz and Associates ,  1968; Lipset and Wolin, 1965 ; Miller 
and Gilmore ,  1965 ; Skolnick, 1969) . The reader is advised to refer to these 
sources for further information. 
Finally,  as is true with most social movements , one cannot pinpoint 
a specific beginning or even a specific end. In fact , most social move-
ments have a variety of beginnings and many ramifications , even after most 
people agree the highlights are over . It  is with this kept in mind that 
the fall semester in 1964 is chosen as the starting point of the summary. 
BACKGROUND TO OCTOBER 1 ,  1964 
The Berkeley FSM1 in 1964 is an event involving colle"ctive behavior 
to which social scientists have continually turned their attention. In 
fact, the term "student protest" is often a referant for the Berkeley FSM. 
As one study (Scranton Commission Report , 1970:22)  indicates, the events of 
Berkeley in late 1964 " . . . became the prototype for student protest 
throughout the decade . "  
The Berkeley FSM was also one of the first attempts to systematically 
research a student protest . As Fisher ( 1972 : 188) ackriowledges, "Beginning 
1 
The following summaries represent a compilation of the works of Bell 
and Kristo!,  1968; Draper , 1965 ; The Editors of the California Monthly, 
1965 ; Foster and Long, 1970 ; Glazer, 1 9 7 0 ;  Heirich, 1971 ; Hook, 1970;  Katz 
and Associates, 1968 ; Lipset and Wolin, 1 965 ; Krassner, 1965 ; Marine, . 
1965 ; Miller and Gilmore, 1965 ; Raskin, 1965 ; Sale, 1973;  Scranton Com­
mission Report,  1970; Searle,  1965 ; Skolnick, 1969 ; Spence , 1965;  Warshaw, 
1965 . Any specific references will be duly cited. 
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with the Free Speech Movement • • . colleges have become veritable lab­
oratories of collective behavior . "  
The University of California has one of the largest student popu­
lations in the U . S .  and is under the statewide administration of the Regents 
of California, along with eight other campuses. In 1964, the Berkeley cam­
pus contained approximately 2 7 , 000 studen t s ;  when broken down , this ac­
counts for approximately 18 ,000 undergraduates and 1 0 , 000 graduate students 
(Glazer,  1970) . The freshman and sophomore classes only account for approx­
imately 28 percent of the total student body (Heirich, 1 9 7 1 ) . In addition, 
there are about 1 2 , 000 faculty and nonacademic employees (Wolin and Schaar, 
1965) . 
The University of California at Berkeley is not separated from the 
town of Berkeley, as is true with other campuses .  In this case,  the cam­
pus is surrounded by the town and separated only be various streets and 
sidewalks. The traditional areas for distributing literature and setting 
up tables by students were the Hyde Park area of the Student Union Plaza, 
and the strip of land around Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue . In the 
pas t ,  the Hyde Park area had been objected to by the students, due to the 
location which " • • • is not in the regular pathway of students" (Heir­
ich, 1971 : 105 ) .  Therefore, most of the activity took place at an " 
entrance to the campus at the corner of Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue 
on a strip of land some twenty-seven feet wide" (Searle ,  1965 :94) . Further­
more,  it should be noted that land which belonged to the University could 
be used as a place to distribute literature and give speeches but not to 
organize,  collect money, or distribute advocative literature . The strip 
of land at Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue had been used previously for 
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political action and the collection of money by various groups , and this 
had been ignored by the administration. This may be due to a variety of 
reasons , either because the University had thought it belonged to the City 
of Berkeley or because they chose not to make an issue out of i t .  
As Sale ( 1 9 7 3 : 162) indicates , 
The First Battle of Berkeley began on September 14 , 1964 , 
with an announcement from the administration of the Univer­
sity of California at Berkeley that organizing and soliciting 
funds for off campus political action would henceforth be 
banned from the campus at the usual areas. 
Specifically, this meant the Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue area, and 
was to be effective beginning September 2 1 ,  1964. Somehow, it had come to 
the attention of the administration that this land , formerly thought to be 
owned by the City of Berkeley, was� in fact , the property of the Regents of 
the University of California and therefore ,  subject to the restrictions 
that the University sets forth, i . e .  no advocacy, organization or collec-
tion of money. An ironic piece of information is that in September of 1959,  
President Kerr,  noting the strip as a potential source of trouble, 
. got the regents to agree that it ought to be turned over 
to the city for the use as a public plaza. But, for reasons 
still unexplained ,  the University ' s  treasurer never carried 
out the instruations to deed over the strip (Raskin, 1965 : 
86) . 
The students were not pleased with the decision of th.e administration, 
and at this point , 18-20 student organizations, both liberal and conser-
vative organizations affected by the decision, formally petitioned for the 
use of the area. This group of organizations came to be known as the United 
Fron t .  Instead , the administration offered the following decision to ac-
counnodate the students :  the Hyde Park area was still offered, as was an 
area on Sproul Hall steps, on an experimental basis, and in regard to the 
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Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue strip, the students could pass out liter­
ature and make speeches, but not advocative literature and speeches; in 
o ther words , the guidelines set forth by University policy was to be main­
tained. This was unacceptable to the students ,  and led to the first all­
night vigil. The vigil began at 9 p.m.  on Sproul Hall steps and lasted un­
til 9 a .m. , the next morning. The estimates of crowd size range from ap­
proximately 300, when the vigil began, to about 75-100 persons in the 
morning (Draper ,  1965; Heirich, 197 1 ;  Editors of the California Monthly, 
1965) . 
The ne.xt incident of collective action taken by the students occurred 
on September 2 8 ,  1964 . The United Front conducted a rally at an unauthorized 
location, in various reports termed "the Rally Tree" (Heirich, 1971 : 1 16) , 
"Dwinelle Plaza" (Draper, 1965 : 33) , "in front of Wheeler Hall" (Editors of 
the California Monthly, 1965 : 106) , and then formed a picket line which 
marched to a scheduled chancellor ' s  meeting at the Student Union Pla za. 
Various reports (e . g . ,  Heirich , 197 1 ;  Draper, 1965) indicated that the 
students " . • • circled in a serpentine pattern through the aisles . • • 0 
(Heirich, 1971 : 1 16) as well as around the perimeter (Draper, 1965 : 33) . Es-
timates of crowd size indicate 1000-1500 students . : . .  
Tables had been set up at this time in various areas (Sather Gate, 
and Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue} , many illegally, because th.ey were 
distributing advocative literature. On September 29,  1964, the tables were 
once again set up. The only action taken against students was verbal in 
that the police simply informed them that their activities were illegal 
and, in a few cases, asked for identification. But the setting up and 
manning of tables and the response of the administration on September 30 ,_1964, 
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was the impetus to the first mass sit-in involving Sproul Hall,  and also 
the sit-in involving the police car. The latter will be the main focus 
of analysis. 
Tables had been set up at noon,Wednesday, and "Within ten minutes 
members of the dean ' s  office staff and the campus police were at Sather 
Gate" (Heirich, 197 1 : 122) . At this time , five students were cited for 
manning the illegal tables and were told to meet in Dean Williams off ice 
at 3 p .m.  that day. The s tudents reacted by drawing up papers with sig-
natures of others who also claimed they had been a part of the manning of 
tables . At 3 p.m. , the five students and others went into Sproul Hall to 
receive collective disciplinary action. Estimates of the size of this 
crowd of students were consistently around 500 (Draper , 1965 ; Heirich, 
19 7 1 ;  Editors of the California Monthly� 1965) , although the official ac� 
count of the Chancellor indicates 300-400 persons (Glazer , 1970) . At this 
point, three more students, some reports indicate they were the leaders of 
the protest (Miller and Gilmore ,  1965 ; Editors of the California Monthly, 
1965) , were cited, making a total of eight students subject to disciplinary 
action. The meeting was cancelled because of th.e large numoer of persons 
present at this time . But the students " • voted to remain in Sproul 
Hall until the administration would agree to deal with them" (Heir1ch, 
1971 : 127} . The estimates of those who remained in Sproul Hall were left 
ambiguously a t  "hundreds" (Miller and Gilmore, 1965 :.XXV) and "The students, 
swelling eventually to several hundreds" (Draper, 1965 : 35) . The sit-in 
broke up at about 2 a.m.  It was during this "sit-in/sleep-in" that the 
name "Free Speech Movement "  was first used and supported by various po-
litical organizations (Editors of the California �onthly, 1965) . Although, 
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Glazer ( 19 70) maintains that it was on October 2 that the FSM was officially 
organized. The final decision concerning the eight cited students , which 
came from the administration, set the tone for what was to follow not only 
in the next two days but in the following months . The decision rendered 
was that the students were to be indefinitely suspended. 
I would now like to turn to a more detailed examination of the events 
of collective behavior that occurred October 1-2 , 1964 . Then, I will give 
a brief overview of the events of collective action that took place during 
the following months. The conclusion of this chapter will be an assess-
ment of the description of events during October 1-2 in light of the pro-
posed elementary features of collective behavior and a summary of the 
findings . 
EVENTS OF OCTOBER 1-2, 19o4 
On October 1 ,  after the declared suspension of the eight students,  a 
rally was scheduled to begin at noon. Also, tables were set up at two 
specific locations on campus; at 9 a .m . , two tables were set up at Sather 
Gate while " three tables had been set up on the lower landing of the 
wide steps leading to the entrance of Sproul Hall" (Heirich , 197 1 : 14 1 ) . It  
was at  one of these latter tables (specifically Campus CORE) that Jack Wein-
berg was present. These tables were illegal according to University regu-
lations, especially since they were specifically asking for contrihutions. 
Therefore, at approximately 1 1 : 30 a .m . , members of the dean ' s  staff 
went over to the Campus CORE table, " . • .  the one nearest the South En-
trance to Sproul Hall , from which they emerged" (Heirich , 1 9 7 1 : 143) . Dean 
Murphy then requested one person (Weinberg) to desist from manning the 
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table and to leave. Murphy also informed him that if he was a student , 
he was violating University regulations and i f  he was a nonstudent , he was 
violating the trespassing law. Finally, he asked Weinberg to identify him-
self. Weinberg promptly refused to answer any of the above, and therefore, 
Dean Murphy requested University of California police Lieutenant Chandler 
to arrest him. Since Weinberg did not identify himself, he was assumed to 
be a nonstudent (which he was ) ,  meaning that they could place him under 
arrest for trespassing. The action of p lacing Weinberg under arrest was 
the impetus for what was to occur in the next 32 hours , although there were 
other mutually reinforcing actions which led to the solidarity of the crowd 
of demonstrators . As Michael Rossman states, when referring to the " ' Police 
Car Episode ' " :  "Understand it and you understand the FSM; the FSM was 
forged around that car • • • and those two days were a miniature of the en-
tire conflict" (Foster, 1970 : 47 ) .  
"A police car had been driven right into the middle o f  the plaza, and 
the police now informed him that he was under arrest for trespassing" (Draper, 
1965 : 4 1 ) . In addition to Lieutenant Chandler , there were four offi�ers from 
the University of California police force which brought Weinberg to the 
police car and prepared to take him away . The students began to surround 
the police car and literally s taged a sit-in. As the Editors of the Cali-
fornia Monthly ( l965 : 1 1 1 )  report: 
About 100 students promptly lay down in front of the police car, 
another 80 or so sat behind i t .  By noon, about 300 demon­
strators surrounded the innnobile police car; by 1 2 : 30 p . m. , 
several thousand students were crowded around the car--which be­
came the focal point and rostrum for the next 32 hours of student 
demonstrations. 
This was one of the better descriptions of what happened .  Many of the 
reports couched the protesters ' actions in generalities ; for example , 
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At this point a group of students spontaneously threw themselves 
in front of the car and &locked its path. Soon they were joined 
by hundreds of others and within an hour the police car was 
surrounded by a solid phalanx of one thousand bodies (Stern, 
1965 : 23) . 
Crowd estimates are basically in a range of  2000-3000 (Miller and Gilmore, 
1965; Krassner , 1965) . 
I think Heirich (1971:  156) makes a very important point when he 
states, "When Mario Savio climbed on top of the car in Sproul Hall Plaza, 
the capture became a focused rally. "  In terms of the opening moves of 
the crowd , i . e.,  the beginning of the sit-in, Heirich (1971 : 152) further 
notes " • . . once the proposal was made by word and demonstration it was 
immediately imitated , just by about twenty-five persons,  then by several 
hundred within a few minutes . "  
Throughout the sit-in, there was a continuous change of speakers, 
both for and against the actions of the d emon'strators, on top of the 
police car. Charles Powell ,  ASUC President, requested that he and Savio 
attempt to discuss the situation with the administration, specifically the 
deans , Chancellor Strong , and Vice-Chancellor Sheriffs. They were gone 
for about an hour while the students continued to hold the police car . 
Draper (1965 : 42} indicates at this time, "There were perhaps a couple of 
hundred actually sitting down , • • but the crowd seemed to extend • • • 
in every direction around the car, a few thousand in number . "  Further-
more , "On one side, the broad steps of Sproul Hall acted as a convienent 
grandstand for a thousand or so , and Savio and Powell had instinctively 
faced in this direction" (Draper , 1965 :43) . Heirich (1971  :461)  makes an 
important distinction between those who sat and those who stood when he 
indicated th.at 
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A code quickly developed around the police car to signal whether 
one was taking part in the capture or was merely watching; persons 
who stpod up were considered to be watching; those who sat down 
signaled by this posture that they had j o ined in the capture of 
the car. 
At approximately 2 : 30 p . m . , there was a new direction or action taken 
by some of the demonstrators on the init iative of Mario Savio, who suggested 
that some of the students join him in go�ng into Sproul Hall to personally 
take their request to the dean. Reports indicate that anywhere from 150-
200 persons went into Sproul Hal l . At approximately 4 p . m. , with consis-
tent reports of about 400 persons in Sproul Hal l ,  there was an aff irmative 
vote by the protesters to remain outside the dean ' s  office, thereby pre-
venting anyone from going in or out of the office. Heirich (1971 : 163} in-
dicates that "This pack-in created a far more explosive situation, because 
of a series of reactions it triggered . "  
The protestors had, during this time, agreed to intervention by some 
faculty members to speak to the administration concerning the situation at 
hand. It was agreed that if the faculty members set up a meeting with the 
administration, then those in Sproul Hall would . leave. 
By approximately 6 p . m . , there was no communication between either 
side, and the police, both campus and Berkeley City police, began closing 
the front doors of Sproul Hall. As the Editors of the California Monthly 
(1965 : 1 12). report the inciden t :  
Angered, about 100 o f  the approximately 2000 students outside 
Sproul Hall charged the doors , packing them to prevent their 
closing. About 20 police officers took up stations at the 
foot of the main stairway leading from Sproul Hall lobby 
to the second floor , where the deans ' offices are. The students 
took up positions on the lobby floor. 
The students finally left at about 9 p . m. , when they talked to faculty 
members who had set up a meeting but were unsuc cessful in their requests . 
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The next major incident of confrontation occurred at approximately 
1 1  p.m. , when " • . •  small groups of anti-demonstration demonstrators 
began converging on the mall from all directions, swelling the crowd to 
about 2500" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965 : 1 13) . Draper (1965:  
44) estimates that there were about 100 Greeks , although he acknowledges 
that the estimates range from 100-200. Heirich (1971: 166) , in a more 
detailed account of the movement of the anti-demonstrators, indicates that 
They quickly encountered a wall of people standing on the edge of 
the demonstration; the new arrivals spilled around toward Sproul 
Hall , climbing the steps and forming a half-moon to the east of 
the police car demonstrators. They did not try to enter the 
area occupied by the seated demonstrators. 
Continuously throughout the night,  there appeared to be a boundary 
confrontation between the seated protestors and the anti-demonstrators, 
who , at various times, threw things into the seated crowd. 
The back and forth verbal abuse between the two groups ended when a 
priest and later Dean Rice addressed the crowd from the top of the police 
car. The anti-demonstrators finally left.  
The demonstrators remained around the car throughout the next day, 
October 3.  The Editors of  the California Monthly ( 1965 : 116} report that 
"At around noon, lunch time onlookers enlarged the crowd to close to 4000 
persons . "  
Discussion between Kerr and Strong indicated that a response to the 
situation was needed . Police were brought in to disperse the crowd a t  6 
p.m. , if the demonstrators ignored Chancellor Strong ' s  announcement that 
the assemblage was unlawful and that those present were to disperse. Es-
timates of the numher of police range from 400-500, including motorcycle 
policemen. But a physical count made by the San Fransisco Examiner indicated 
965 policemen (Draper , 1965) . 
I: 
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Demonstration spokespersons asked to meet with Kerr at this time . At 
first, Kerr was not receptive, but finally a meeting was scheduled for 
5 : p .rn.  
At  approximately 5 : 30 p.m. , " • . .  onlookers and protest sympa-
thizers swelled the crowd between Sproul Hall and the Student Union to 
more than 7000 . Spectators lined the Student Union balcony and the roof 
, 
of the Dining Commons" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965 : 1 17) . At 
one point in time , the potential for conflict arose when " six cam-
pus police officers penetrated the periphery of the crowd--in an effort to 
reinforce the stranded police car--the demonstrators packed themselves 
solidly around the car" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965 : 1 17) . 
At approximately 7 : 15 p . m . , an agreement was reached between Kerr 
and the demonstration spokesmen which was publicly announced to the crowd 
around the police car at 7 : 30 p . m. It ended and the crowd disbanded when 
Mario Savio , addressing the crowd , stated : "Let us agree by acclamation 
to accept this document . I ask you to rise quietly and with dignity, and 
go home" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965 : 1 18} . 
The pact of October 2 was to have considerable implications in the 
events involving collective behavior which follow. I would now like to 
turn to a brief overview of the events which followed this pact. 
EVENTS PROCEEDING FROM THE POLICE CAR CAPTURE 
The next incident of collective behavior took place on October 5 .  
Again, there was a noon rally held on Sproul Hall steps, with various 
speakers addressing the crowd . This rally resulted in no arrests or major 
confrontations , although ''The rally was technically illegal under University 
regulations regarding nonstudent speakers" (Editors of the Californi� 
• . . 
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Monthly, 1965 : 121) . Many of those who spoke that afternoon, for example 
Savio , w.ere suspended and therefore technically nonstudents.  Of the 
literature that was reviewed ,  there were only two estimates of crowd size; 
the Editors of the California Monthly ( 1965 : 121)  reported that "approx-
imately 1000 s tudents gathered • • • •  " while Draper (1965 : 64) indicates , 
"Over 2000 attended • II 
In between this event and the next major episode of collective be-
havior (November S) , attempts to resolve the situation at Berkeley took 
place mainly in committees composed of students and/or faculty and/or the 
adminis tration. The suspended students '  cases were turned over to the 
Faculty Committee on Student Conduc t ,  although in a previous agreement ,  
the cases were t o  be turned over t o  the S tudent Conduct Committee o f  the 
Academic Senate.  This latter committee, though, never existed. There 
was also considerable debate as to who should sit on the Study Committee 
on Campus Political Action which was finally expanded with an agreeable 
compromise on the members , although at a later point-, the FSM rejected 
the committee. :Basically, the committee was " . . .  in agreement that 
advocacy of off campus political action should be allowed on campus. They 
remained divided, however, in regard to actions that might not be 'within 
the limits of the law ' "  (Heirich , 19 71 : 229} . One final committee that is 
important and should be noted is the Ad Hoc Academic Senate Committee on 
Student Suspensions , also known as the Heyman Committee. As its name implies, 
it reviewed the cases of the eight suspended students. 
"On Sunday November 8 • • • the FSM i.ss.ued a statement announcing its 
intentions to end the moratorium on direct action civil disobedience" 
Qleirich , 1971 : 242) . In their opinion, the committees set up to resolve 
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the situation were making little progress, which was not in the direction 
the FSM wanted. Therefore , at noon the next day , November 9 ,  a rally was 
held on the steps of Sproul Hal l .  Also, tables were set up on these steps. 
Roth the FSM and other sympathetic organizations participated . These tables 
were illegal in that donations were taken and there were sign-up sheets. 
Reports are consistent in that approximately 75 persons'  names were taken 
by members of the dean ' s  staff. In terms of the rally, various speakers 
addressed the crowd from the top of an old dresser. The crowd was reported 
to be about 600, approximately 200 sat down to show support ,  while about 
400 persons just watched from the fringe (Editors of the California Monthly, 
1965) . 
On November 13,  the Heyman Committee announced its decision regarding 
the eight suspended students. Their recommendation included reinstatement 
of six students effective as of their original suspension dates and " • . 
six week suspensions for Art Goldberg and Mario Savio, the suspensions to 
begin September 30 and end November 16  . • . •  " (Editors of the California 
Monthly ,  1965 : 146) . 
On November 20 , there was a mass student rally on Sproul Hall steps. 
The purpose was to gather support for a mass vigil and also a march to 
the regents'  meeting. The estimates pertaining to crowd size indicate a 
range of 3000-5000 students . Heirich (197 1 : 251) , in bis analysis of this 
rally, gave one of the better descriptions of any of the events of collec-
tive behavior that occurred at Berkeley in these months. What the des-
cription basically amounts to is a brief description of boundary main-
tenance and boundary interpenetration. It seems that at the same time the 
FSM called a rally, so did the college pep organizations . The following 
' i  
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is an excerpt from Heirich ' s  ( 1 9 7 1 :251) description : 
Two large , and quite different, crowds collected in the plaza. 
One , consisting of sympathizers of the FSM, was facing east 
toward the Sproul Hall steps. The other crowd • • .  was 
facing south, toward the Student Union steps. 
Before the FSM could begin its rally, cheerleaders of the 
other group began leading a 'Beat Stanford ' yell. For a while 
things were tense , for it was clear that neither rally was 
going to give way to the other. 
Then Steve Weisman, a member of the FSM Steering Committee, 
had an inspiration. He led the FSM crowd in a 'Beat Stanford ' 
yell. The cheerleaders responded with a ' Free Speech' yell. 
Gradually the two rallies blended, the crowds mingled, and 
the tension disolved. 
With this gesture , the boundaries between the two crowds 
were broken, people turned eas t ,  and the FSM rally began in 
earnest. Because of the double scheduling of the area and 
the publicity about the free concert ,  the group had a very 
large crowd. 
This is an example of how important boundaries can be when examining the 
behavior of crowds. This example also indicates the composition of the 
crowd at two different points in time. It does not just state the size 
of the crowd, without giving other relevant information. Heirich (197 1 :  
252) also gives a very informative description of the march to the regents 
meeting . Much of the literature just indicated that the crowd marched, 
whereas Heirich ( 19 7 1 )  indicates the direction of the movement,  the for-
mation of the crowd during the march and also took account of space and 
density. As Heirich ( 1971 :252) indicates , 
The FSM steering Committee and the people at the front marched 
around behind the crowd and then north, toward the main drive 
of the campus. Monitors moved forward among the crowd , motioning 
people to join the line six-abreas t .  
The marching maneuver o f  circling the crowd effectively 
broke up the sense of spatial separation that allows persons on 
the edge of a crowd to remain uninvolved. 
Things were relatively quiet over the next few days, but on Novemeber 
28,  Chancellor Strong sent out letters concerning new disciplinary action 
against Savio and Goldberg. The letters were in regard to activity on 
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October 1-2 , the period previously asswn.ed to be covered in the Ad Hoc 
Faculty Committee report which was not heeded but instead, the regents 
had accepted a proposal which had recomm.ended reinstatement of the stu-
dents, with suspension as the only penalty for six of the students and 
that two students, Savio and Goldberg, b e  on probation for the rest of 
the current semester. The FSM took these letters as a direct indication 
of the insincerity of the administration . 
In response ,  the FSM presented an ultimatum to the administration 
concerning the disciplinary action and the issue of freedom. of political 
activity. The deadline was December 2 .  Also at this time, before the 
December 2 sit-in, the Graduate Co-ordinating Committee, sympathetic to 
the FSM, met and decided to call for a strike of classes beginning on 
Friday . On December 2 ,  the FSM held a rally in Sproul Hall Plaza, at-
tended by 4000-5000 persons (Heirich, 197 1 ;  Marine, 1965} , although one 
report indicated 6000 persons (Draper,  1965} . It was at this time that 
approximately 1000-1500 students began to occupy four floors in Sproul 
Hal l .  Heirich (1971  :272)  indicates that "They came in groups , a steady 
stream, somewhere between one thousand and fifteen hundred peopl e . "  
Throughout the afternoon and evening , people went in and out of the 
building , which was officially closed. At 3:05 a . m . , December 3 ,  an 
assemblage of 635 uniformed police officers began making arrests. This 
was done on the action of Governor Brown , without the approval of Pre.s:i-
dent Kerr. On each floor, the students were asked to leave; Draper (1965: 
104) indicates "About 200 did leave the building before the police reached 
them, leaving about 800 . "  Also , each student was individually given a 
chance to leave or face iI!Dllediate arrest. Each person was given the 
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choice to be walked or be dragged out. The arresting procedure con-
tinued through the night and into the next day; it took about twelve 
hours to arrest the demonstrators . There are different estimates given 
of the number of persons arrested; these range from 773 persons (Heirich, 
1971) to 780 (Fitch, 1965), to 814 (Sale, 1973) . Of the literature that 
was reviewed ,  there was consistent agreement that the directions to ar-
rest the students was a gross misj udgement , rather, the demonstrators 
should have been left alone until they disbanded of their own decision. 
On December 4 ,  a rally was again held in the Sproul Hall area . 
Spence ( 1965 : 2 1 7 )  indicates at this time, " • • .  more than 8000 students 
rotated picket line duty . "  In terms of the rally, Heirich ( I°971 : 279} 
notes, "A great crowd had gathered on the Student Union roof and bal-
cony, as well as in the playing field above Sproul Hall across Barrows 
Lane and on the Plaza itsel f . "  The estimates o f  crowd size vary from 
5000 to 10 ,000 persons . In terms of the elementary features of collec-
tive behavior, Heirich ( 19 7 1 :279) notes, "At mos.t rallies each person 
placed himself so that he had at least a small perimeter of space a-
round him, anywhere from six inches to three feet. That morning • .  
There were no boundaries of personal territory . "  The rally continued for 
two hours, with various speakers addressing the crowd . The student strike 
of classes continued , in fact , it specifically lasted for five days--
December 4-8. The effectiveness of the strike remains ambiguous, de-
pending on the source of information. 
The final incident of collective behavior that should be mentioned , 
occurred on December 7 at the Greek Theatre \dlere President Kerr was to 
give a speech concerning a plan " . • • to inaugurate a new era of free-
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dom under law . "  At 1 1  a .m. , approximately 1 6 , 000 persons were assembled 
to listen. Mario Savio previously had asked for permission to speak to 
the audience concerning another FSM rally which was to follow. He was 
denied permission but stated his intentions to speak anyhow. After 
President Kerr finished his speech , Savio walked over to the podil.llll and 
was promptly seized by the . police and brought backstage under force. 
After pleas by various persons , both faculty and students , and a con­
stant chant by members of the audience to let him speak, Savio was al­
lowed to address the crowd. 
According to Draper (1965 : 124) , "The students streamed back to 
Sproul Hall Plaza, which filled up as solidly as had the Greek Theatre, 
with 8000 to 10 ,000 peopl e . "  Two other estimates of crowd size (Editors 
of the California Monthly, 1965 ; Heirich, 1971) indicated 10 ,000 persons . 
On this day, there was also a vote taken by· the Graduate Co-ordinating 
Committee to end the strike. 
Finally, on December 8, the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate 
met, and by a vote of 824-115 , approved "The five-point proposal made by 
the Committee on Academic Freedom against control of student speech and 
political advocacy" (Miller and Gilmore � 1965 : XXIX) . The University 
Board of Regents did not accept this proposal, and a new committee, the 
Emergency Executive Committee on Academic Freedom of the Berkeley Division 
of the Academic Senate, was formed to s tudy the situation. Their decision 
was accepted and was publicly presented by Martin Meyerson, the man who 
replaced Strong, who left his position a s  chancellor on January 2 .  The 
announcement is best stnnmed up by Sale (1973), in reference to the Battle 
of Rerkeley. Sale (1973 : 162} states, 
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I t  ended--as much as such things ever end--three months and 
twenty days later on January 3 ,  1965 , with an announcement 
from the same administration that organizing and soliciting 
funds for off campus political action would henceforth be 
permitted on campus at the usual areas. 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER 1-2 , 1964 
In this section of the chapter, I would like to assess what infer-
mation we have gained when examining Berkeley on October 1-2 , 1964, in 
terms of the elementary features of collective behavior . As was true 
with Chapter III , the episodes of collective behavior occurring on October 
1-2 have been described in generalities for two reasons : ( 1 )  to confine 
the specific discuss ion of the elements of collective behavior to this 
section; and (2) much of the literature reviewed has , in fact, described 
the crowd and the actions of the crowd in terms of generalities. One 
notable exception is that of Heirich ( 19 71 ). .  His analysis was the most 
sociological and, at various times , did provide a comprehensive view 
of the action of the crowd in terms of  the elementary features of callee-
tive behavior. But this did not extend consistently throughout the analy-
sis , as Heirich ( 197 1 : 202) acknowledges in writing of the police car 
capture, " • for no direct account of the genesis of this action is; 
available . "  Therefore, although Heirich ( 1971) did attend to sot'le of the 
elementary features of the crowd , they were not analyzed to the degree 
which many social scientists (i . e .  McPhail, 1972 ; Fisher, 1972;  Milgram 
and Toch , 1965 ; et al . )  argue they should be. 
What most authors seemed to do was describe the crowd ' s  movement in 
generalities, and this only pertains to books and articles that deal di-
rectly with the crowd . A majority of the literature confined their major 
analysis of the crowd to one of two things : ( 1 )  a subjective interpre-
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tation of the moral and ideological issues involved; or (2) the almost 
exclusive examination of participant characteristics by the use of survey 
data. This is the type of information that many argue should not be the 
limit of analyses of collective behavior, that the main focus of con­
cern must be the . crowd , per �· 
The Berkeley FSM was covered extensively by social scientists,  news­
papers , and television. This would seem to suggest that records would be 
available in which to analyze and address the elementary features of col­
lective behavior .  Therefore, with this kept in mind , I would now like 
to turn to an assessment of the description of the events of October 1-2. 
Leadership. In contrast to Kent State University, leadership was 
an extensively covered element throughout the literature. But the con­
cern of this section is l imited to the events of  October 1-2, and when 
attention is turned to this time period , a systematic analysis of leader­
ship is lacking. The major question that should be addressed is that of 
recognizing leadership when it is present. There were numerous speakers 
on the roof of the police car throughout the two days . Are we to assume, 
therefore, that whoever was on top of the car constituted the leader at 
the moment? There were only three specific references to the leadership 
during the police car incident . Heirich ( 1 9 7 1 :162} indicates that "During 
the first afternoon two additional personalities emerged as leaders of 
the demonstration. "  Heirich (1971} is specifically referring to Dustin 
Miller and Bettina Aptheker. While Glazer (1970 :82) indicates , "By that 
time , it was clear that the leadership of the movement was now coming 
exclusively from the civil-rights and left-wing political groups . "  Mario 
Savio , by one author (Raskin , 1965 : 78} , referred to as 11 • • •  the arch­
angel of the student revolt , "  has also been implicated as one of the 
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leaders during this time. As H.eirich (19 7 1 : 157) notes: "At this point 
individual students began asking Mario Savio questions about who he is , 
how he became the leader of the demonstration • • • • " 
For the most par t ,  the literature (cf.  Bell and Kristo!, 1969 ; 
Draper, 196 5 ;  Foster and Long, 1970; Glazer, 1970;  Heirich, 1971 ;  et al . }  
did not distinguish between leaders of the FSM throughout the last part of 
1964 and leadership specifically in the events of October 1-2 , 1264 . By 
this analysi� one can conclude that either there were no specific leaders 
involved during the events of October 1-2 or that there was not any at-
tempt by researchers to address the issue . 
Physical_ Conditions Created � Dense Aggregates of People. For the 
most part, I found little research specifically addressing this element 
of collective behavior . Heirich ( 1971 :28) discusses the issue when he 
indicates, "It is clear the individuals in a densel:y packed , :commonly 
focused crowd often arrive at conclusions they would not have reached by 
themselves . • • hence arrangements for using time and space • • • affect 
the ease with which a crisis. context can be established and validated 
among a given set of observers . "  Furthermore ,  Heiri:ch (1971 : 204) in dis·-
cussing crowds, indicates that "This dense packing of observers should 
have limited the individual ' s  ability to gather evidence . . . •  " 
This supports the argument of this thesis that we must pay more 
systematic attention to the role played by the physical conditions created 
by dense aggregates of people � But in th.e literature reviewed, I did 
not find any application of . this element to the crowd. Most of the de-
scriptions were along the lines of describing the crowd in generalities 
and metaphors . For example, the Editors of the California Monthly 
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(1965 : 11 1 }  indicate that " • • .  by 1 2 : 30 p.m. , several thousand students 
were crowded around the car • " or " • • • within an hour the police 
car was surrounded by a solid phalanx of one thousand bodies" (Stern, 
1965 : 230) , and finally, "A police car taking to jail a person charged 
with manning a table unlawfully was surrounded in a sea of students" 
(Wolin and Schaar , 1965 : 354) . This use of metaphors , su·ch as those cited 
above, rather than taking account of the event in a systematic way, is 
what Milgram and Tech (1965) argue should be avoided . The literature 
abounds with such metaphors and generalitie� and these do nothing to aid 
us in understanding a crucial feature o f  the crowd. 
Draper (1965 : 54)  accounts for why the police were not requested to 
arrest the students in the Plaza in terms of the density of the crowd and 
the role it played . For example, Draper (1965 :54) indicates , 
This corridor would have had to be cut through an inter­
vening crowd of a couple of thousand students , who were 
not themselves sitting down but who were jammed in between 
the building doors and the sitters , and who would be com­
pressed even more by the movement of other thousands in 
the Plaza toward the scene of action. 
Crowd Shape . This element of collective behavior was also neglected 
in the literature dealing with the events of October 1-2. The crowd 
shape has important implications in terms of feedback between partici-
pants.  It also has implications for agents of social control in that 
they must gauge a response taking into account the location and shape of 
a crowd. Heirich (1971)  indicates that when Savio spoke on the rooftop 
of the police car , the capture became a focused rally. Since it became 
a focused rally, are we to assume that the crowd was circular around the 
police car since " . . . circularity • permits the most efficient 
arrangement of individuals around a common point of focus" (Milgram and 
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Toch, 1965 : 518) ? May (1965) indicates that the political makeup of the 
Berkeley campus can be characterized by a circle with radical leader-
ship at the center, a large semi-student population at the fringe and in 
between, a shifting , potentially active mass. When one examines the 
formation of the students around the car, we may also be able to identify 
a shape somewhat consistent with the above which , in turn, would provide 
information on the crowd . 
There were two specific references to the crowd shape, as indicated 
by Draper ( 1965 ) .  "There were perhaps 300 sitting down now, in an irregu-
lar free form area around the car • • The crowd was a solid wall 
circling this theatre-in-the-round" and also, "The irregular outline of 
the sit-down area extended a pseudopod closer to the police fortress 
(Draper, 1965 : 55 ; 56) . This indicates something about the crowd shape but 
does not consider the implications . More frequently, there were descrip-
tions such as " • the crowd seemed to extend as far as the eye could 
see in every direction around the car, a few thousand in number" (Draper, 
1965 :42) , and "At 1 1 : 15 p.m. , small groups of anti-demonstration demon-
strators began converging on the mall from all directions swelling the 
crowd to about 2500" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965 : 1 13} . 
Crowd Boundaries. Again, there was little information concerning the 
,, 
boundary of the crowd , which includes permeability and sharpness. The lit-
erature indicates that a serious conflict arose when anti-demonstration 
demonstrators went over to the sit-in around the police car. At .this time, 
there were also police stationed around the area. As Draper (1965:44} in-
dicates, "Estimates of the 'Greek' contigent run from 100-200 • • .  but 
this was more than enough if the aim was to touch off a riot in order to 
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involve the police." It is proposed that a systematic examination of the 
crowd boundaries and how they were maintained would yield considerable 
information as to why a riot did not develop. Heirich ( 1 9 7 1 : 166) gives 
some indication of the boundary of the crowd when he states: 
They quickly encountered a wall of people standing on the 
edge of the .demonstration ; the new arrivals spilled around 
toward Sproul Hall , climbing the steps and forming a half­
moon to the east of the police car demonstration. They did 
not try to enter the area occupied by the seated demonstrators. 
In terms of the sharpness of the boundary, Heirich (1971} also in-
dicates a code which signals that if one was standing , he was merely a 
watcher , but if one was sitting, he was an active participant.  
Finally, in terms of the permeability of the crowd , the Editors of 
the California Monthly (1965 : 1 17)  note that , " • • •  as six campus police 
officers penetrated the periphery of the crowd--in an effort to reinforce 
the stranded police car--the demonstrators packed themselves solidly 
around the car . "  Although, the word "packed" does not yield considerable 
information, it would seem that the permeability of the crowd was low, 
Besides Heirich ' s  ( 1971)  description of the code, there seemed to 
be no distinction made in terms of numbers and boundaries of those who 
were active participants and those who were simply onlookers and/or sympa-
thizers. 
Individuals or Groups in Collective Behavior. There is considerable 
support indicating that it was mainly groups involved in the events of 
October 1-2. A survey conducted by Lyons Qieirich, 197 1 : 213} of 618  per-
sons who had participated in the demonstration around the police car in-
dicates that "More than 75% knew at least four other demonstrators before 
the incident only about one person in twenty joined without knowing 
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anyone else on the scene . "  A survey of Berkeley students , by Kathleen 
Gales in 1965 , also supports this contention (Heirich , 1971) . This implies 
that friendship ties were present during the incident.  
Crowd Size. The issue of crowd size has been dealt with in previous 
sections . I would now like to bring in an overview of the consistency of 
the reports. Heirich (1971 : 28) indicates that "The number of persons in 
an area and their dispersion affect the chance that an unusual act will 
be widely noted . "  He goes on further to discuss aspects of crowd size 
in relation to other aspects of crowd behavior. The actual number of 
people present in a given situation are very important , but often reports 
are not consistent across the literature.  In terms of October 1-2 , the 
literature wa� fairly consistent in regard to the number of persons pre-
sent. However, often the size was ambiguously described as "hundreds" 
or "thousands;"and for the most part, the estimates did not distinguish 
between those actually sitting and those just standing. 
To begin with, the Editors of the California Monthly ( 1 �65 : lll} es-
timate. that at noon there were 300 persons , while one half hour later, 
there were " . . . several thousand students " around the car. 
Draper (1965) estimates a couple of hundred sitting but a few thousand 
persons actually there a few minutes past 12 p .m.  At approximately 2 : 30 
p .m. , the range of estimates of  those entering Sproul Hall is 150-200 
(Draper , 1965 ; Editors of the California Monthly, 1965} • .  All reports 
agree that at 4 p.m. , there were 400 students actually in Sproul Hall.  
At 6 : 15 p .m. , when police attempted to close Sproul Hall doors , the 
Editors of the California Monthly (1965) estimated 2000 persons in the 
Plaza, of which 100 charged the police. The number of anti-demonstration 
74 
demonstrators reported was 500 (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965) , 
while 'Draper ( 1965) noted 100 "Greeks ,n but acknowledged that other es-
timates range from 100-200. 
It was estimated that approximately 200 persons spent the night 
around the car, although this was the only size reported in the liter-
ature (Draper, 1965) . The only other estimates available for the crowd 
size note that at 12 p .m. , October 2 ,  there were 400 persons on the Plaza, 
which increased to 7000 at 5 : 30 p.m.  (Editors of the California Monthly, 
1965) . Draper (1965) indicates that at 5 : 30 p .m . , there were 300 per-
sons actually sitting and that number increased to 500 by 6 : 30 p.m.  
The number of police reported in the area varies. The Editors of 
the California Monthly ( 1965) and Heirich (1971) estimated 500 policemen, 
including 100 motorcycle policemen, while Miller and Gilmore (1965) leave 
the number ambiguously at "several hundred . "  Draper (1965 : 54) indicates 
that "The official word was that there were 450-500 police , hut only The 
San Fransico Examiner (Hearst) reporters made a physical count and they 
reported almost a thousand--965 to be exac t . "  
In sum, the number o f  persons present varied according to what as-
pect of the crowd one was reporting and at what time. And again, many 
of the estimates did not distinguish between those sitting and those 
only there to watch. 
Participant Characteristics. This was one of the most extensively 
covered issues, as was true with Kent State University. The charac-
teristics of  participants can usually be obtained fairly accurately 
after the event.  
One point that I would like to bring up is that, as with Kent State, 
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there were direct references to a communist and "Castroite and Maoist" 
agitators behind the student protest. Most of the literature refuted 
this, but not all (cf.  Draper, 1965; Glazer, 1970; Hook, 1970; Lipset, 
1965; Miller, 1965; Peterson, 1965; Searle, 1965; Somers , 1965; Stern, 
1965).  
In terms of systematic research, extensive survey data were gathered 
on the participants . The results are too numerous to cover adequately 
here; therefore, I will give a brief overview of the content of these .  
Lyons ( 1965) prepared a questionaire dealing specifically with the 
police car demonstration participants. This survey (Lyons , 1965 : 525) 
indicated that "Generally, the demonstrators seem to be more liberal 
politically and to live in less restrictive housing than the total Uni-
versi ty population. 11 Lyons (1965 : 525) further noted that the demons trator 
II generally falls into the academic intellectual and the non-con-
formist intellectual groups . . • .  " 
There was also a random survey conducted by Somers ( 1 965: 532) which 
summarizes the total University population and then compares 11 • • •  the 
difference between students who took opposing sides in the controversy . "  
Again, the results are too numerous to adequately cover here; therefore, 
only 3 portion of the results is presented. Among the various issues 
the survey examined were satisfaction with the University in which at 
least 82% of those sampled reported themselves as satisfied or very satis-
fied, and also, 34% of the total sample were generally in favor of the 
tactics of the demonstrators. At least one-third of the students felt 
that once the demonstration of October 2 got underway , the action of the 
administration toward the demonstrators was not in good faith. Somers 
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( 1965 :538) further indicates that in terms of sympathy for the demon-
strators, " • • •  there was widespread sympathy on campus for the demon-
strators, sufficient to tolerate , although not without criticism, the 
tactics they used . "  
The total sample was then broken down into categories of militants, 
moderates and conservatives , respec tively those who were for both the 
tactics and goals of the demonstrators , those who supported the goals 
but not the tactics, and those who were both against the goals and tac-
tics (Somers ,  1965) . Somers ' ( 1965) analysis of the results suggests 
that two-thirds of the militants classified themselves as either liberal 
democrats or independent s ,  while approximately three-fifths of the con-
servatives were comprised of equal numbers of conservative Republicans , 
liberal Republicans , and independents .  Finally, in terms of major field 
of concentration and support for the FSM, the social science, humanities 
and physical science majors accounted for three-fourths of the identified 
militants. This is in contrast to approximately one-third of the con-
servatives who reported as being in these majors. This survey is fre-
quently cited in literature dealing with Berkeley. 
Another well-documented survey of the characteristics of the par-
ticipants was that done by Kathleen Gales and then reanalyzed by Heirich 
(Heirich, 1971) . A summary of the data (Heirich, . 197.1 : 207} indicates, 
Thus such personal variables as age, sex, political background , 
or attitudes toward one ' s  family offer little help in predicting 
who will take part in these ventures .  In striking contra s t ,  such 
immediate situational variables as length of time on the Berkeley 
campus, place of campus residence , and major subj ect of s tudy 
work very well to predict who will become involved . 
As an exampl e ,  both Somers ' and Gales' data indicate a difference in 
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sympathetic attitude toward the FSM, with women more sympathetic, but 
there is no difference in the proportion of those who acted (Heirich, 1972) . 
There were numerous surveys about the participants throughout the 
conflict in the last months of  1964 at Berkeley , e . g . , Kat z ' s  survey of 
62 students who were arrested during the December 3 sit-in (for more 
extensive coverage of the surveys which took place, the reader is advised 
to turn to the following sources : Heirich, 1 9 7 1 ;  Kat z ,  1968; Lipset and 
Wolin, 1965; Miller and Gilmore, 1965 ) .  
In terms o f  qualitative interpretations o f  the characteristics of 
the participants , Miller (1965: 53) indicates three rough categories of 
student supporters: 
Some students derive gratification and a sense of meaning 
from their involvement in politics • • • • Another segment of 
the student body constitutes , more or less, a community of self 
pity . It is made up mostly of older undergrads and a few 
beginning graduate students who have sulked through their 
years at Berkeley in a pose of militant sensitivity . 
My impression is that the revolt drew its leaders and its 
most vocal and committed supporters mainly from these two groups. 
With the final group, the vast mass of sympathizers who signed 
petitions, swelled the ranks of sit-ins, or went on strike, 
alienation is not so much the issue • • • • 
This is only one example of the various nonsurvey-type characterizations . 
Often, neither surveys nor nonsurveys take account of nonstudent par-
ticipation, of which one estimate was ten percent (Hook, 1965) . 
It is sufficient to indicate that this element of collective be-
havior, participant characteristics, is one of the most extensively 
covered, probably due to the ease with which this type of data can be 
generated. 
In conclusion, Heirich (197 1 : 65 ) ,  in discussing the various results 
of the surveys, makes a very important point: 
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• • • these st�uctural pushes toward a liberal-to-radical 
political outlook for some of the students did not make what 
occurred inevitable. Possession of  a generalized attitude does 
not necessarily lead persons to act in terms of it.  The effect 
of these influences , rather , was� create an increasingly large 
reservoir of students living near the campus who possessed sen­
timents generally sympathetic to the goals of radical political 
actions and who were structurally unimpeded (by problems of 
schedule coordination or sanctions thatcould be imposed by other 
persons) from joining in such action if they wished to do so. 
Therefore, it is not enough to just examine participant characteristics, 
one must also take account of the other elementary features of collective 
behavior in order to examine crowd behavior .  
Crowd Movement .  McPhail ( 1972) ' has argued that not enough attention 
is paid to the formation and dispersal of crowds.  This statement is sup-
ported by the review of the literature concerning Berkeley on October 
1-2 . Statements such as " • students spontaneously formed a sit-in 
" and "The crowd broke up when the University agreed not to press 
charges . • " do not tell us anything about the crowd but were fre-
quently used throughout the analysis.  There were many times during the 
32 hours in which an analysis of the above features was warranted. For 
example , at 7 : 30 p . m . , when Savio publicly announced the agreement and 
asked the demonstrators to leave, statements such as " • • •  the students 
were dispersing" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965 : 118} are the 
norm rather than the exception. 
Heirich ' s  ( 197 1 : 148) analysis, using tapes from KPFA radio , allowed 
one to gauge the length of time betwwen episodes; for example , 
Burton White (into the microphone) : "And now the entire group, 
bit by bit,  seems to be sitting. (This announcement comes 40 
seconds after the statement that there are a dozen persons in 
front and fifteen behind the car} . The group which before was 
a dozen in front has become some 50, 75 . "  
But this does not indicate other important features of the movement of 
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the crowd (e . g .  convergence on a connnon time-space location) and is open 
to the suojective interpretation of the reporter. For example, at the 
point when the anti-demonstrators left , Heirich (197 1 : 174) indicates , "A 
minute later, the announcer reports that the loudest group has left for 
the corner of Bancroft and Telegraph. "  This gives no indication of the 
dis.persal of this group, nor does, "It was not long before the whole 
platoon slunk away" (Draper, 1965 :45} . 
The actual movement of the crowd was also neglected at th.e time when 
Savio requested some of the demonstrators to join him in Sproul Hall. The 
reports only indicate that "Savio then led about 150 students into Sproul 
Hall,  where they sat outside the office of the dean of students" (Heirich, 
197 1 :  172) . And one report (Hook, 1970 : 87) notes, "Additional protestors 
stormed into Sproul Hall for another sit-in . "  There is quite a difference 
between the words "led" and "stormed . "  Also, questions can be raised such 
as in which area of the demonstrators around the car did those who joined 
Savio come from, and how was this movement facilitated? Information of 
this type, concerning crowd movement ,  will allow researchers to pinpoint 
specific actions rather than generalizing the actions of some of the crowd 
to those of the crowd as a whole. 
SUMMARY 
In terms of the elementary features of collective behavior with re-
gard to the Berkeley FSM, one finds a general lack of information con-
cerning these feature s .  But this need not be the case, as was shown with 
Heirich ' s  (1971) analysis which presented an examination of  the event con-
sistent with the elementary features of collective behavior. However, 
there still remains considerable work to be done. 
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In sum, the majority of the literature that dealt directly with the 
events of Berkeley did so in a superficial manner. In fact, most of the 
works dealt only with a biased interpretation of the ideological and 
moral issues that were then applied to the events and the participants. 
From examining the literature, we remain unenlightened regarding the ac­
tions of the crowd ,  per �· For instance, the following represents two 
accounts of the Berkeley FSM: one report , citing the incidents of October 
1-2 , came to the conclusion that "Obviously the leaders of the FSM were 
guilty of riot in preventing an arrest o f  an individual charged with 
breaking the law" (Hook, 1970 : 189) , while a second report indicates that 
"There were no riots. Save for the incident of the ' captured ' police car, 
the mass rallies, sit-ins, and the student strike were all conducted with 
admirable dignity and calm . "  (Wolin and Schaar , 1965 :363) . 
It is therefore proposed that, by an examination of the elementary 
features of collective behavior, these could lend empirical support to 
either of the above statements, thereby coming to more critical con­
clusions regarding the events. 
The next chapter will consist of a synthesis of the information ob­
tained in this and the preceding chapters .  Specifically, the task of 
this thesis will be reiterat ed, including what was actually done, and 
what further information this generated , and finally, an assessment and 
overall conclusion regarding future research in collective behavior .  
I . 
� · 
DISCUSSION 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Many researchers (e. g . , Fisher, 1972;  Milgram and Toch, 1965; Mc­
Phail,  1972;  Weller and Quarentelli, 1973; et al . )  have argued that as 
a field of study, collective behavior lacks important theoretical and 
methodological knowledge. This tends to be mutually reinforcing in that 
theoretical perspectives offer guidelines to gathering empirical data 
concerning collective behavior phenomena, and, in turn, empirical data 
are used to assess and provide support for theoretical notions. 
The present theoretical inadequacies, it has been argued, include 
such problems as a failure to determine the theoretical boundaries of 
collective behavior ,  the lack of theoretical clarity which results in 
limited empirical knowledge, a failure to advance clear variables , and 
a lack of definition of collective behavior . Researchers , as such, lack 
specific categories of observable behavior to direct their attention to 
the issue of what to look for and where. Many authors attempt to es­
tablish a reasoning for why an event occurred without previously attempting 
a systematic and detailed description and analysis of what actually hap­
pened. 
It has been proposed that the ''why" of what happened cannot be 
adequately explained in the absence of empirical data on certain essential 
features . This directs our attention to the issue of clear variables and 
concepts. Much of the behavior of crowds has been described in generalities, 
81 
82 
metaphors, and emotion-laden terminology. This has often been due to the 
biases of authors and also because we lack a systematic analysis of the 
methods of the crowd . Pickens (1975 : 25) has argued quite reasonably 
that " • • •  collective behavior lacks an established terminology with 
which to differentiate, define, and identify its objects of investi-
gation . "  To deal with this problem, in this thesis , there have been 
eight suggested elementary features of collective behavior. It has been 
proposed that these eight elements are essential for a systematic analy-
sis of  what is the least attended stage in regard to collective behavior 
phenomenon, specifically , the middle stage. By attending to these features , 
we may be better able to generate essential empirical data on the crowd 
per se,  thereby achieving a more comprehensive understanding of collec-
tive behavior phenomenon and resolving some of the previously cited prob-
lems, both theoretical and methodological , involved in the analysis of 
collective behavior .  
Therefore, the task of this thesis i s  an attempt to analyze variables 
which researchers argue have been traditionally ignored in studies of 
collective behavior phenomena. These elements , it is proposed , are 
necessary for an accurate description of the phenomena to be explained 
and consequently , for that explanation. 
In sum, the problems surrounding theoretical and methodological 
issues must be brought " • • •  to a level at which measurement , controlled 
observation, and imaginative experiments can begin to play some part in 
choosing among competing views" (Milgram and Toch, 1965 : 584) . It is sug-
gested here that attending to the elementary features of collective be-
havior is conducive to the aims cited above.  
I 
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SUMMARY OF TIIE DESIGN 
To carry out the intentions of this thesis , two events were chosen 
for analysis, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement in 1964, and Kent State 
University in May , 1970. It is granted that these events occurred prior 
to the existing body of literature which argues for a more systematic 
analysis and description of such events. The basis for choosing these 
two events is that there is an extensive amount of literature concerning 
them, and also, they were well attended by social scientis ts. The most 
immediate concern of this thesis was to examine and evaluate a key episode 
of collective behavior within each event using the suggested elementary 
features of collective behavior. An evaluation of the events , I proposed , 
would indicate what we did and what we did well; what needs to be done in 
the future; and finally, what can and cannot be dealt with adequately. 
In sum, if we attended to gathering information of the type suggested 
in this thesi s ,  would we be better able to empirically evaluate the occur­
rence of collective behavior? 
To begin with, a sunnnary of the events prior to the chosen situation 
was considered as the origins or background. Secondly , a somewhat more 
detailed description was given of the event that was chosen for further 
analysis in light of the elementary features of collective behavior .  
Finally, the outcomes subsequent to the key dates were reviewed . In the 
case of  Berkeley, since the chosen day for review was at an early point 
of the Free Speech Movement ,  the events of collective action following 
this date were numerous and therefore, covered more extensively. The 
key difference in the amount of time spent on outcomes stems from the 
fact that the Berkeley Free Speech Movement is considered a social move-
. * 
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ment, whereas the events at Kent State University were regarded as a 
series of episodic outbursts. 
The rationale for choosing a certain event is given elsewhere, but 
in sum, these events seemed most conducive to an analysis , with regard 
to the elementary features of  collective behavior proposed. 
In the final sections of Chapters III  and IV, the literature was 
assessed regarding these events , taking into consideration the suggested 
elementary features of collective behavior .  The specific information 
that I attempted to gather was , were these features attended to in the 
literature,  and if  so , how well was this done. A summary is then pro­
vided of where research, addressing the crowd per �' stood at that par­
ticular time. 
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
A summary of the findings indicates that the elementary features of 
collective behavior which I addressed were neglected in the literature.  
One of the most extensively covered elements or variables was that of  
participant characteristics. As stated before, this type of data can be 
more easily obtained after the event and therefore, should be more system­
atically covered. But it should be noted that ''Measures of attitude and 
personality • • .  as well as socioeconomic and demographic attributes 
have yielded consistently low correlations with behavior" (McPhail, 1972: 
1 1 ) .  Therefore, we cannot depend solely on this infotmation to yield a 
comprehensive analysis of the crowd. 
The physical conditions created by dense aggregates of people, crowd 
shape, crowd boundaries , and crowd movement ,  as defined and discussed in 
Chapter I I ,  were the most neglected characteristics in both of the events. 
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When covered at all, these elements were consistently defined am­
biguously by generalizations and metaphors.  
There was of ten considerable inconsistency in reporting crowd size 
at Kent State University, while at Berkeley , the range of estimates was 
more consistent, but often given at different times , thereby making com­
parisons difficult. 
Leadership was not well attended to at Kent State University, while 
at Berkeley , there was considerable discussion of the leaders of the FSM, 
though there was no distinction made between the entire course of the 
events and the events of October 1-2. Most reports of Kent State Uni­
versity indicate no formal leadership, but the question to be raised is, 
how do we know leadership when it is present? 
Finally, in terms of individuals or groups in collective behavior ,  
the literature dealing with Kent State University has very little on 
this element. Of the reports that do deal with this feature, there is 
no real agreement as to who went as individuals and who went with one or 
more persons . The evidence for Berkeley more strongly suggests that the 
crowd was made up of people with friendship ties and not isolated in­
dividuals . In fact, a survey of participants in the capture of the police 
car conducted by Lyons (Heirich, 1965 : 2 1 3 )  indicates that "More than 75% 
knew at least four other demonstrators before the incident . 
In sum, there seems to be a valid argument that we have little 
theoretical or methodological knowledge p.ertaining to the crowd and 
collective behavior phenomena in general. 
" 
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ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Given that the main body of literature arguing for an empirical 
analysis of the suggested variables occurred after the events that were 
analyzed happened, could this information have been obtained? I think 
the answer to this is yes. The events that were analyzed were attention­
getting by both the media and social scientists. Furthermore, in both 
events , the participants gave direct information that the rallies were 
to take place at a specific time and place. 
The events of collective behavior that occurred October 1-2 at 
Berkeley lasted 32 hours , were fairly well organized, and therefore, were 
very available to an examination of such features as crowd size, crowd 
boundaries, and crowd movement.  Although the events of Kent State Uni­
versity on May 4 , 1970, were of a shorter duration, there were many photo­
graphs taken which could have aided researchers . In fact, many social 
scientists (e . g . , Berk, 1972; Fisher, 1972;  McPhail ,  1972;  McPhail and 
Wohlstein, 1983; Milgram and Toch, 1965; Pickens , 1975; Wohlstein, 1977) 
have advanced strategies to deal with the observation of collective be­
havior when conditions such as a short t ime-span exis t.  Furthermore, 
these strategies can be equally applied to episodes which last considerably 
longer, such as the Berkeley Free Speech Movemnt . Therefore, techniques 
which presently exist have reduced some of the problems associated with 
the analysis of episodes of collective behavior.  
Given the availability of various t echniques which minimize many of 
the problems associated with research , this still leaves open the issue 
of what students of collective behavior should be looking at. Many 
questions and criticisms have been generated in this thesis by a review 
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of the literature in light of the elementary features of collective be­
havior.  But, the question still remains : would it have made a difference 
if we had attended to gathering information of the type suggested in this 
thesis? 
Researchers, at the point in time these events took place, made an 
inquiry into collective behavior on a level at which general information 
could be given concerning the crowd and its participants . It  is the 
argument of this thesis that what needs to be done in the future is to 
get away from examining the crowd and its participants only in terms of 
this general observation. Instead, research should be brought to a level 
at which analysis includes the examination of . crowd characteristics, 
i . e . , the crowd as a phenomenon to be studied independent of its pur-
pose, setting, and individual participants . Researchers have typically 
started from the point of view that, given a collection of people, why 
have they gathered and what happened . It  is the contention of this 
thesis that an analysis of collective b ehavior must begin with the crowd , 
per se.  The crowd is something that is empirically distinct from the 
characteristics of the participants , and more than the sum of its parts. 
Much of the research that was examined i.n this thesis , dealing with Kent 
State University and the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, continually focused 
on the contributions of individuals or groups of individuals to explain 
what happened and why it happened . But the crowd , as an entity , does 
exhibit characteristics which can be sys tematically analyzed and these 
characteristics include boundary, shape, and size. The elementary fea­
tures of collective behavior can suggest some patterned regularities that 
exist in crowds, irrespective of their specific location and purpose . 
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Furthermore, it is suggested that unless these dimensions are given at­
tention, this ''why" of what happened, in terms of the event and its out­
come Cs) , cannot be explained. The role of individuals in crowd behavior 
and their characteristics are important, but are limited in their use­
fulness to empirically explain crowd phenomena . 
In this thesis , it has been shown that the elementary features of 
collective behavior ,  for the most part, are not well attended . What is 
needed to resolve this situation includes not only more precise articu­
lation of what is going on, but also, more importantly , a shift in the 
standard used to analyze episodes of collective behavior ,  a new basis 
in which to begin research of the phenomena termed collective behavior. 
This standard involves an emphasis on the previously cited elementary 
features of collective behavior .  
One o f  the implications of  conducting research on the elementary 
features of collective behavior consists in a more comprehensive view 
of the crowd and the participants and also with regard to prediction 
of phenomena . This, in turn, can lead to an enhanced and well-thought­
out theoretical perspective within the field of collective behavior. In 
this thesis , I have dealt mainly with the methodological issues involved 
in analysis.  But the methodological issues are not divorced from a 
well-thought-out theoretical s cheme. It  is suggested that theoretical 
attention to the elementary features of collective behavior would pro­
vide what is necessary to understand and explain collective behavior 
phenomena. 
Another implication of conducting research utilizing these features 
is that what produces violence may be found in these dimensions. If 
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these features were given systematic attention, students of collective 
behavior may be better able· to predict when violence will occur, and the 
form and content it might take. 
Two events were chosen for systematic analysis in this thesis. Kent 
State University, on May 4 ,  1970 , resulted in violence and the death of 
four students , whereas at Berkeley , on October 1-2 , 1964, violent con­
frontations did not take place, although the situational facilities seemed 
conducive to such an occurrence. The question that can be raised is why 
did one event produce violence and not the other? In fact, why do some 
events or episodes of collective behavior result in certain types of ac­
tivities and others do not? It is proposed that an application of the 
elementary features of collective behavior to analyses of 'events of · 
collective behavior will provide a starting point in which to answer the 
above questions. 
A systematic and empirical analysis of events in light of the pre­
viously mentioned variables may enable social scientists to explain what 
occurred and why it  occurred. Over the long run, with continued emphasis 
in this area, stronger conclusions can be arrived at. For example , knowing 
that if a number of these features are present, a certain outcome will 
result. This will enable researchers to not only predict but to explain. 
This information is of particular importance when incidents of collective 
behavior result in violence. For instance, crowd boundaries are ex­
tremely important.  When two hostile groups clash, it is largely a boun­
dary confrontation. This can then be analyzed in terms of crowd inter­
penetration. Furthermore, agents of social control may be better able 
to anticipate and gauge an appropriate response to a given situation when 
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increased knowledge of the crowd , � se,  is gathered. Therefore , an 
analysis on this level not only has empirical possibilities , but is also 
of practical importance to possibly reduce unnecessary violence between 
crowds and agents of social control . Again, when one considers crowd 
boundaries , which includes the aspect of permeability, agents of social 
control may be better prepared to align themselves in relation to the 
crowd and to judge when direct action is warranted and when it is not. 
In conclusion, future research must consider the eight cited ele­
mentary features of  collective behavior which have been termed essential 
building blocks for pursuing an understanding of such events . The 
present literature on the events involved at Kent State University on 
May 4 ,  1970 and Berkeley on October 1-2, 1964, do not tell us all we 
need to know to establish what are the social properties of collective 
behavior .  To answer questions such as , how are crowds similar or dif­
ferent and does this produce differences in degrees of violence, students 
of collective behavior must be able to transcend the specific purpose 
or setting in which crowd behavior is taking place. The elementary 
features of collective behavior can be applied to any type of crowd and 
crowd behavior ,  and therefore, can help to resolve some of the problems 
of what to look for and where. This , in turn, can lead to an enhanced 
theoretical perspective by providing information on recurrent behavior 
patterns of crowds. The crowd must be what is studied and not limited 
simply to where things are studied (Milgram and Toch, 1965) . 
By giving theoretical and methodological attention to the elementary 
features of collective behavior ,  researchers can begin to inves tigate 
with more clarity the phenomena we generically term collective behavior . 
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